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INTRODUCTION
Eat local. Such a small phrase yet such a loaded proposition. Buying
food from nearby sources has become a popular objective. This aim is as-
sociated with helping farmers in one’s country or region; observing the
seasonality of one’s location; eating fresher foods; striving for food secur-
ity; and protecting the environment. One of the unmistakable messages of
the “locavore” movement is that importing food—particularly food that
comes from far away—causes environmental harm. The theory is that
transporting food long distances results in the release of high levels of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere and is thus a dangerous
contributor to climate change. Proponents of this view therefore argue
that “food miles”—the distance food travels from farm to plate—should
be kept to a minimum. Farming interests in countries that import signifi-
cant amounts of agricultural products have sought regulations to differen-
tiate between foods based on how far they have travelled. And some
supermarkets, particularly in Europe, have been utilizing differential la-
beling, such as placing an airplane sticker on produce that has been air
shipped. The overwhelming implication, then, is that the farther food trav-
els from farm to plate, the more environmental harm is caused.
The problem is that, in reality, food miles are a poor proxy for envi-
ronmental harm. Studies have demonstrated that differences in farming
methods as well as natural factor endowments can mean that growing
some products locally may in fact result in more GHG emissions than im-
porting those same products. Notwithstanding this disconnect, some coun-
tries have considered legislation relating to food miles. Were a
government to legislate discrimination on the basis of food miles, or to
otherwise endorse such a policy through its actions, it could be vulnerable
to a World Trade Organization dispute resolution challenge. Even if food
miles labeling were to fall outside the WTO’s purview due to insufficient
government involvement, it would nonetheless raise important issues of
fairness and justice. Such concerns arise for developing countries that rely
upon the revenue from food exports and whose overall carbon emissions
are miniscule compared to those of developed countries, as well as for
farmers that ship their products long distances while having an overall en-
vironmental impact comparable to, or lesser than, local producers. Using a
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life cycle analysis to assess the carbon footprint of products resolves some,
but not all of these concerns, while implicating additional difficulties.
This article examines the international trade law, environmental, and
development implications of campaigns to convince consumers to make
food purchases based on food miles. In Part I, we explain in more detail
the term “food miles,” and how the concept has been used around the
world. Part II addresses the use of food miles as an indicator of environ-
mental harm. We argue that food miles are, in fact, a poor proxy of such
harm and therefore should not be used. Part III considers whether food
miles labeling currently in use, as well as legislation politicians have pro-
posed in, inter alia, Sweden and the United Kingdom, could be success-
fully challenged through a WTO dispute settlement proceeding. This Part
addresses potential actions under the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
Agreement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and
the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement, as well as
the availability of any exceptions. Our TBT analysis takes into account the
three 2012 Appellate Body decisions addressing the TBT Agreement,
U.S.–Clove Cigarettes; U.S.–Country of Origin Labeling (U.S.–COOL);
and U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico). We also consider the extent to which labeling
schemes based on food miles may fall outside the scope of WTO commit-
ments. In Part IV, we address the implications that reducing food miles
may have for developing countries. Additionally, we examine and critique
alternatives to food miles for those wishing to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions through farming and food consumption. In particular, we discuss
the use of life cycle analyses to measure carbon emissions as well as the
impact of changes in diet, farming methods, and modes of transportation.
I. THE FOOD MILES CONCEPT
The concept of “food miles”—or the distance foods travel from their
point of origin to their point of consumption—has been around for many
years1; however it has only more recently captured widespread attention.
Assessments of the factors contributing to the earth’s global warming
problem reflect that air transport (of passengers as well as freight) ac-
counts for a significant volume of GHG emissions. Thus, it is perhaps not
surprising that a range of commentators have argued that long-distance
shipping of foods, particularly via air-freighting, equates to environmental
harm.2 The narrative has increasingly developed into one that focuses
largely on the distance food travels (food miles), rather than the method
of travel or other variables that affect the GHG emissions associated with
the shipment of the food. It encourages communities to buy their food
1. Tim Lang, now a professor at City University in London, is said to have coined the
expression with colleagues in 1991 for a television documentary. See Tim Lang, Origin Un-
known, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/aug/03/green
politics.foodanddrink.
2. E.g., DELOITTE, AN APPETITE FOR CHANGE: FOOD AND BEVERAGE 2012 13
(2007) (“Air freight has a high carbon footprint relative to the real benefits to the consumer
and there is a growing view that such foods should be clearly labelled.”).
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locally when possible, on the theory that doing so will result in lower GHG
emissions than buying imported foods. Accordingly, food shipped long dis-
tances—for example from Australia or New Zealand to Northern Hemi-
sphere markets—is associated with a high level of food miles and with
harming the environment to a higher extent than does sourcing foods from
closer locales.
The equation of food miles with environmental harm has led to adver-
tising campaigns, retail and labeling distinctions, policy decisions and pro-
posals, and social movements designed to encourage purchase and
consumption of locally grown and sourced foods instead of those that have
been imported from afar or have been air-freighted.
A. Advertising
In the United Kingdom, food miles have figured prominently in adver-
tising. For example, the British butter company Dairy Crest launched a
multimillion-dollar advertising campaign based on the food miles concept
to urge U.K. consumers to buy its Country Life brand instead of the New
Zealand dairy company Fonterra’s Anchor brand.3 Dairy Crest’s adver-
tisements depicted New Zealand’s butter exports as traveling via soot-
belching ships.4 The advertisements suggested that Anchor butter was of
lower quality and that it caused more environmental damage because it
traveled nearly 18,000 kilometers to get to the U.K. market.5 In addition,
many websites promote the food miles message. In 2006, the Farmers’
Weekly website initiated a campaign with the message ‘Local food is miles
better.’6 The website of the Australian environmental group “Environ-
ment Victoria” asserts:
In wealthy countries like Australia, we have a bad habit of eating
food that has been grown on the other side of the world. If your
oranges were grown in California, they have travelled over 12,000
km to get to you. If they got here by boat, they’ve sent a lot of
greenhouse gas into our atmosphere—even more if they got here
by plane. . . . By eating locally produced food, instead of food with
high food miles, you can make a positive difference to our
environment.7
B. Retail Measures
Even large-scale retailers have embraced the food miles concept. In
2007, major U.K. retailers Tesco and Marks & Spencer began placing air-
3. Food Miles: No Export Impact, RURAL NEWS, Oct. 3, 2006.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. E.g., John Ballingall & Niven Winchester, Food Miles: Starving the Poor?, 33
WORLD ECON. 1201, 1202 (2010).
7. Eating the Planet, ENVIRONMENT VICTORIA, http://environmentvictoria.org.au/
content/eating-planet (last visited May 15, 2014).
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plane stickers on produce that has been air freighted.8 U.S. retail giant
Walmart has also sought to appeal to consumers wishing to “buy local.”
Walmart’s website indicates the chain has a policy of buying from local
growers, and that it uses a “food miles calculator” so that its buyers can
“enter information on each supplier and product, determine product
pickup locations and select which of our 38 food distribution centers the
product will reach. With this information, the calculator computes the to-
tal food miles, which the buyer can use when making buying decisions.”9
Walmart has also instituted a program “to reduce food miles” that is en-
couraging producers to grow produce in new areas, such as corn in Missis-
sippi and cilantro in Southern Florida.10
C. Governmental and Non-governmental Policies
Several governments are providing support for initiatives designed to
increase local food production and consumption. In 2009, Sweden planned
to launch a “buy local” component to its Climate Smart Food Programme
until the European Commission challenged the plan and asked Sweden to
change it.11
Furthermore, some politicians have suggested imposing differential
taxes on food based on food miles. Former British Transport minister Ste-
phen Byers has suggested the imposition of a tax based on the distance
food travels. As an example, he said that air freighting a kilogram of
kiwifruit to Great Britain results in the production of five kilograms of
carbon dioxide.12 This example, while in fact inaccurate—kiwifruit are
shipped by boat rather than air freighted—nonetheless captured interna-
tional attention.
Also within the United Kingdom, the organic standards-setting body,
the Soil Association, reviewed its standards in 2008 and initially recom-
mended a change that it would no longer certify air-freighted produce as
organic unless it also met additional ethical or fair trade standards not
required of non-air-freighted produce.13 This proposed standard would
have had the practical effect of preventing air-freighted produce from
8. LINDSAY HOGAN & SALLY THORPE, ISSUES IN FOOD MILES AND CARBON LABEL-
LING 14 (Dec. 2009) [hereinafter ABARE Report], available at http://143.188.17.20/data/
warehouse/pe_abarebrs99001677/foodmiles.pdf.
9. Walmart Produce: Our Commitment to You, Walmart, http://instoresnow.walmart
.com/ article.aspx?Center=Food&top=87508&id=44214 (last visited May 15, 2014).
10. Id.
11. The European Commission’s concern was over the free movement principles of
the European Union; however, Sweden’s motivations appear to have been based on the view
that buying local foods would be good for the environment. See Commission Halts Swedish
Buy Local Climate Campaign, AGRA EUROPE, Sept. 18, 2009, cited in CHRISTOPHER BAR-
CLAY, STANDARD NOTE, FOOD MILES, June 2012, H.C., SN/SC/4984, at 8–9 (U.K.), available
at http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN04984.pdf.
12. Greg Meylan, Emission Impossible, SUNDAY STAR TIMES, Nov. 5, 2006, at A9.
13. Els Wynen & David Vanzetti, No Through Road: The Limitations of Food Miles 1
(Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 118, Oct. 2008), available at http://www.adbi.org/
files/2008.10.wp118. limitations.food.miles.pdf.
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bearing the organic label. Ultimately, after pressure from major supermar-
ket chains, the Soil Association retreated from this position, choosing only
to monitor the air freighting of produce but not to link it to labeling re-
quirements.14 However, it remains the position of many in the organic
food movement that “organic” should symbolize “sustainable” as well as
organic production methods.15
In the United States, numerous government programs encourage local
food production and consumption. These include a U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) program that provides low-income individuals with
vouchers to use at local food purveyors such as farmers markets and road-
side stands; federal legislation requiring the USDA to provide schools with
funding or other assistance to enable them to include local foods in their
subsidized meal programs; and a USDA initiative to encourage the crea-
tion of local food systems.16
In November 2013, the Canadian province of Ontario passed a Local
Food Act.17  The Act’s objectives are to “foster successful and resilient
local food economies and systems in Ontario, help increase awareness of
local food in Ontario and develop new markets for local food.18
These programs appear (at least in the United States and Canada) to
be designed primarily to provide economic opportunities and to assist the
disadvantaged rather than to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Nonethe-
less, these government policies will have the effect of enhancing local food
production even though doing so may have detrimental effects on agricul-
tural producers from Africa and other regions. Local food production may
also mean that a significant share of the transport of such food will be
carried out by the use of passenger vehicles carrying small quantities of
produce. Thus, this government assistance may result in more GHG emis-
sions per item from transport than would be implicated by the bulk ship-
ment of the same item by rail or boat of foods from further afield.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also jumped onto the
food miles bandwagon. The Natural Resources Defense Council, an envi-
ronmental NGO, has headlined one of its publications, “Food miles: How
far your food travels has serious consequences for your health and the
14. Soil Association “Gives in” to Supermarket Lobby over Air-freighted Organic
Food, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 27, 2009, 2:21 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11299
84/Soil-Association-gives-supermarket-lobby-air-freighted-organic-food.html.
15. BARCLAY, supra note 11, at 6–7.
16. For additional examples of federal and state legislation and other initiatives to
encourage local food movements, see Lauren Kaplin, Energy (In)Efficiency of the Local
Food Movement: Food for Thought, 23 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 139, 145-48 (2012); Der-
rick Braaten & Marne Coit, Legal Issues in Local Food Systems, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 9,
22–32 (2010).
17. Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Bill 36, Local Food Act, 2013, available at http://
www.ontla.on.ca/web/bills/bills_detail.do?locale=en&BillID=2754.
18. Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Local Food Act, 2013, available at http:/
/www.omafra.gov.on.ca/english/about/localfood.htm.
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climate.”19 The report concludes that “all else being equal—locally grown
foods are a better choice.”20 The buy local movement has even garnered
support in Australia, where many exporters are affected by food miles
campaigns elsewhere. The Australian Food Sovereignty Alliance has re-
leased a “People’s Food Plan” that calls for Australians to source and pro-
cess 80 percent of all Australian food within 150 kilometers of its point of
consumption,21 and is currently pushing for the legislation of a local food
act akin to that passed in Ontario, Canada.22
D. Social Movements and Food Miles
The food miles concept is often employed by individuals and organiza-
tions that seek to promote the consumption and production of organic and
local foods and to minimize environmental harm. For example, the website
Food Miles, introduces its food miles calculator by explaining: “Food miles
are a way of attempting to measure how far food has travelled before it
reaches the consumer. It is a good way of looking at the environmental
impact of foods and their ingredients.”23 The website Climate
Choices–Children’s Voices, aimed at teaching children to make environ-
mentally friendly decisions, asserts: “Reducing food miles can have a dra-
matic effect on reducing carbon dioxide emissions.”24
Concern about the connection between the distances foods travel and
harm to the environment has also reached popular culture. Mainstream
author Barbara Kingsolver’s book Animal, Vegetable, Miracle: A Year of
Food Life identifies a variety of harms caused by long-distance shipping of
foods.25 Restaurants routinely tout their use of local purveyors, and the
food miles concept has also led to the opening of restaurants that cater to
so-called “locavores” who favor eating only locally-grown products,26 and
19. Food Miles: How Far Your Food Travels Has Serious Consequences for Your
Health and the Climate, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL (Nov. 2007), http://food-
hub.org/files/resources/Food%20Miles.pdf.
20. Id. at 1. But the NRDC concedes that “[w]e did not attempt a full lifecycle assess-
ment of all climate and air impacts.” As such, all else is not equal.
21. Adrienne Francis, Australians Urged to Eat Local Foods, ABC NEWS (Nov. 12,
2012, 9:57 AM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-11-12/local-food-production-plan/
4366410?section=act.
22. Margot Foster, Push on for Local Food Act, ABC RURAL (Mar. 24, 2014), http://
www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-24/tch-local-food-act/5340268.
23. Food Miles Calculator, FOOD MILES, http://www.foodmiles.com/ (last visited May
15, 2014).
24. Food Miles and Carbon Dioxide, CLIMATE CHOICES – CHILDREN’S VOICES, http://
www.climatechoices.org.uk/pages/food3.htm (last visited May 15, 2014).
25. BARBARA KINGSOLVER, ANIMAL, VEGETABLE, MIRACLE: A YEAR OF FOOD LIFE
(2009). Michael Pollan addresses similar themes in some of his books. See, e.g., MICHAEL
POLLAN, IN DEFENSE OF FOOD: AN EATER’S MANIFESTO (2008); MICHAEL POLLAN, THE
OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR MEALS (2006).
26. See, e.g., LOCAVORE WINE BAR, http://www.thelocavore.com.au/ (last visited Mar.
18, 2014); LOCAVORE RESTAURANT, http://locavoreca.com/ (last visited May 15, 2014).
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individuals who aim only to consume foods sourced from within a certain-
mile radius.27
To be sure, there are numerous motivations behind the locavore
movement. These include the goals of eating fresher and more nutritious
food, keeping local farms under cultivation, keeping money in the local
community, ensuring better food safety through non-industrial production
methods, the ability to see how their food is farmed, as well as reducing
fossil fuel use in transporting food.28
Why is this happening? A combination of factors, including the desire
to protect the environment stemming from climate change concerns, but
also protectionism, renewed interest in food security as a result of food
shortages and rising food prices, quality and nutritional advantages from
fresh foods, food safety issues, and increased trade in food, including de-
mand for out of season perishable products.29
II. ASSESSMENT OF FOOD MILES AS A PROXY
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM
The widespread use of marketing campaigns and other forms of adver-
tising based on food miles may have significant negative effects for agricul-
tural producers that export their products long distances, such as
Australian and New Zealand farmers, and for producers with limited ex-
port markets, such as many developing country agricultural interests.
If higher levels of food miles were, in fact, very closely correlated with
more carbon emissions, we might view it as acceptable, even necessary, for
New Zealand and Australian exporters, as well as some developing coun-
try farmers, to have their products labeled with negative imagery or to be
the target of negative advertising. The reality however, is quite different.
Researchers have demonstrated that food miles are a very poor proxy for
environmental harm.30 For this reason, we find it troubling that the use of
the food miles concept in regulations and marketing will have negative
effects on a range of agricultural exporters.
27. See Margot Roosevelt, Local Food Movement: The Lure of the 100-mile Diet, TIME
MAGAZINE, June 11, 2006; LOCAVORES, www.locavores.com (last visited May 15, 2014);
Maryruth Belsey Priebe, An Overview of the 100-Mile Diet, ECOLIFE, http://www.ecolife.com/
health-food/eating-local/100-mile-diet.html (last visited May 15, 2014); 100 MILE RADIUS,
http://www.100mile-radius.com/?spref=fb (last visited May 15, 2014).
28. Jordan Kleiman, Local Food and the Problem of Public Authority, 50 TECH. &
CULTURE 399, 400 (2009). Reducing obesity rates, particularly in children, is another motiva-
tion. This objective may have contributed to First Lady Michelle Obama’s decision to plant a
vegetable garden at the White House.
29. Wynen & Vanzetti, supra note 13, at 2.
30. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT FOR ENVIRONMENT, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, THE
MILES AS AN INDICATOR OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 2005, ED50254 (U.K.) [hereinaf-
ter DEFRA REPORT]; CAROLINE SAUNDERS ET AL., FOOD MILES – COMPARATIVE ENERGY/
EMISSIONS PERFORMANCE OF NEW ZEALAND’S AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY vii (2006) [herein-
after LINCOLN STUDY].
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A. Food Miles: A Flawed Metric
The food miles narrative is easy to understand and has an intuitive
appeal. It seems only logical that purchasing imported food that is trans-
ported from halfway around the world would cause more environmental
harm than buying the same items locally. The reality, however, is that
more food miles do not necessarily equate to higher levels of GHG
emissions.
1. DEFRA Study
In 2005, a study commissioned by the U.K.’s Department for Environ-
ment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) concluded that food miles alone
could not be used to develop a practical and reliable indicator of sus-
tainability and environmental harm.31 The DEFRA study did not conduct
life cycle analyses to compare the overall carbon footprints of imported
and domestic foods. However, it examined different modes of transporting
food,32 and also considered the effects of organic versus nonorganic farm-
ing.33 The study found, inter alia, that farming methodologies affected
overall environmental impact and sustainability.34 Thus while looking at
food miles alone would suggest that food should be sourced from as close
by as possible, in fact in some circumstances imported organic foods would
have a lesser impact than domestically grown nonorganic foods.35 In addi-
tion, the study included a case study that compared emissions associated
with tomatoes imported from Spain to those grown in U.K. greenhouses.36
Although the U.K. producers used less fertilizer than the Spanish growers,
the U.K. growers used significant amounts of energy to heat the green-
houses. The authors had not conducted a full life cycle analysis, but none-
theless concluded that there were clearly instances where it would be
environmentally preferable to import fresh produce rather than growing it
in out-of-season conditions in the U.K.37 The study also noted that emis-
sions from individual trips to the grocery store can be significant, and that
therefore rather than focusing solely on food miles, efforts should be di-
rected in part at reducing the incidences of food shopping by car.38
2. Lincoln University Study
A 2006 study commissioned by Fonterra39 and the New Zealand Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and conducted by Lincoln University
31. DEFRA REPORT, supra note 30, at 95.
32. Id. at 37.
33. Id. at 68–73.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 73.
36. Id. at 67.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 79.
39. Company Overview, FONTERRA, http://www.fonterra.com/global/en/About/Com
pany+Overview (last visited May 15, 2014).
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convincingly demonstrated that food miles are in fact a poor proxy for
negative environmental impact.40 The study determined that, due to New
Zealand’s efficiency in producing agricultural products, it is less harmful
for the environment for British consumers to purchase certain New Zea-
land products instead of locally grown products, notwithstanding the pol-
lutants generated through transporting the items to the United
Kingdom.41 The study concludes that looking at food miles alone will not
provide an appropriate measure of environmental impact, and it argues
that a better indicator would be to look at the total energy used in the
production of the agricultural product. Indeed, when a lifecycle analysis is
conducted,42 it reveals that the production process itself, rather than trans-
portation, accounts for most of the greenhouse gasses emitted in food
production.43
The Lincoln University researchers conducted a “cradle-to-gate” life
cycle analysis to compare the GHG emissions generated by producing
U.K. lamb, dairy products, apples, and onions for the domestic market on
the one hand, with GHG emissions generated by producing these same
items in New Zealand and transporting them to the U.K.44 The study con-
cluded that, even factoring in the transport of the New Zealand products
to the U.K., New Zealand was twice as energy efficient at producing dairy
products; four times as efficient in producing lamb; and on the whole more
efficient at producing apples and onions.45
These conclusions may be hard to believe at first. However, the results
demonstrate that there are significant differences between New Zealand
and U.K. farming methods for these products. In the case of lamb, New
Zealand farmers utilize far less fuel and fertilizers in the production pro-
cess than do U.K. producers.46 In the case of onions, while New Zealand
onions require more energy inputs in the production process, U.K. onions
that compete on the market with New Zealand market have to be cold-
stored for nine months (due to the different growing seasons in the two
countries), resulting in more significant GHG emissions.47 New Zealand
40. LINCOLN STUDY, supra note 30.
41. LINCOLN STUDY, supra note 30, at 285.
42. Even a lifecycle analysis may not capture all of the sources of GHG emissions in
the production process, including labor, capital, fuel and fertilizer. Wynen & Vanzetti, supra
note 13, at 10.
43. While a lifecycle analysis will produce a far more accurate measure of a product’s
environmental impact than the distance it has traveled, as is discussed below, lifecycle analy-
ses are complex and very expensive, and thus they are not a panacea.
44. The Lincoln researchers did not conduct a full (cradle-to-grave) life cycle analysis,
but instead considered emissions resulting from cradle-to-gate (thus omitting disposal and
waste management occurring once the products leave the farm gate). See LINCOLN STUDY,
supra note 30, at 16. The researchers concluded that this data was not necessary as the con-
sumers’ disposal and waste management outputs would likely be similar for locally purchased
and imported versions of a given product. Id. at 20.
45. Id. at 93.
46. Id. at 92.
47. Id. at 82.
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apple production is less energy-intensive than U.K. production, and U.K.
apples that would take the place of New Zealand apples in the market-
place would be cold-stored for up to six months.48 For dairy production,
UK producers have much higher emissions from fuel use and fertilizers
than do New Zealand producers.49 Some of these variations result from
climactic and soil differences. New Zealand producers are able to use far
less fertilizer than their U.K. counterparts. Similarly, due to climate differ-
ences, New Zealand producers generally do not need to house their sheep
or cattle in heated structures such as barns, while U.K. producers do.50
This data demonstrates that food miles alone do not provide an accu-
rate picture of the GHG emissions that will result from consuming local
versus imported products.
3. AgResearch Study
Other researchers recently conducted a life cycle analysis in order to
determine the greenhouse gas footprint of New Zealand lamb from farm
through to consumption and disposal by a U.K. consumer.51 The research-
ers determined that all transportation, including international shipping, ac-
counted for only five percent of the GHG emissions attributable to the
lamb.52 Interestingly, the study also noted that it had not included the
emissions resulting from the U.K. customer driving to and from the store
to purchase the lamb but indicated such emissions could add up to as
much as seven percent of the overall carbon footprint for the lamb—i.e.
more than the international shipping and all other transportation com-
bined.53 New Zealand Agriculture Minister David Carter pointed to the
48. Id. at 72.
49. Id. at 61.
50. Id.
51. The New Zealand Meat industry and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
commissioned this research, which was undertaken by AgResearch, a New Zealand Crown
Research Institute. See S.F. LEDGARD ET AL., A GREENHOUSE GAS FOOTPRINT STUDY FOR
EXPORTED LAMB 1 (2010), available at http://www.mia.co.nz/docs/press_releases/greenhouse
_gas_footprint_study_for_exported_nz_lamb._march_2010.pdf. The GHG footprint for lamb
comes primarily from methane and nitrous oxide rather than carbon; however, the study
converted these emissions into carbon dioxide equivalents for purposes of the study.
52. Id. at 6. The largest contributor to the footprint was the methane released by the
animals in the natural course of digesting pasture grasses, which accounted for 57 percent of
the overall GHG footprint. Id. at 1.
53. This omission was consistent with the Publicly Available Standard (PAS) 2050 used
to footprint GHG emissions. Id. at 11. This is “the most detailed and comprehensive standard
to date.” Shane Baddeley et al., Trade Policy Implications of Carbon Labels on Food, 13
ESTEY CENTRE J. INT’L L. & TRADE POL’Y 59, 69 (2012). Although it is impractical to at-
tempt to standardize the distances customers travel to purchase their food and their means of
travel, the reality is that a consumer driving by car to the local farmers’ market likely causes
more emissions per food item than airfreighting large quantities of the same item from a
developing country. Id. at 69.  The methodologies used were consistent with the GHG ac-
counting methodology New Zealand submitted to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change. See LEDGARD ET AL., supra note 51, at 1.
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study as further evidence that the food miles argument had been
debunked.54
Studies such as those described above have led many to the conclusion
that “food miles are nothing but a misleading distraction.”55
4. Transport–Not All Miles Are the Same
The relevance of food miles is further diminished when we take into
account the vastly different GHG emissions resulting from different forms
of transport.56 Thus while air freighting results in a high level of emissions
relative to other forms of transportation, shipping by water transport re-
sults in far lower emissions, lower even than rail or truck.57 A U.S. study
determined that grapes shipped by boat from Chile to Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania resulted in a similar level of carbon dioxide emissions per pound
as truck transport of grapes from California to Philadelphia. Even though
the “food miles” were much higher for the Chilean grapes, this did not
translate into higher GHG emissions because water transport is signifi-
cantly more energy efficient.58
And when the transport of food is examined, it reveals that the bulk of
emissions come from the road transport of food within a country, rather
than cross-border shipments.59 Indeed, one of the biggest contributors to
54. John Hartevelt, Carter Hails ‘Debunking’ of Food Miles Argument, STUFF.CO.NZ
(Apr. 7, 2010, 5:00 AM), http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/farming/3551987/Carter-hails-de
bunking-of-food-miles-argument.
55. Pierre Desrochers & Hiroko Shimizu, Eating Local Hurts the Planet, SALON (June
16, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/06/16/eating_local_hurts_the_planet/. One au-
thority has even gone so far as to say the “concept of food miles is unhelpful and stupid. It
doesn’t inform about anything except the distance traveled.” Id. (quoting Dr. Adrian Wil-
liams). See also Gareth Edwards-Jones et al., Testing the Assertion that ‘Local Food is Best’:
the Challenges of an Evidence-Based Approach, 19 TRENDS IN FOOD SCI. & TECH. 265 (2008)
(“We conclude that food miles are a poor indicator of the environmental and ethical impacts
of food production. Only through combining spatially explicit life cycle assessment with anal-
ysis of social issues can the benefits of local food be assessed.”).
56. This distinction is sometimes overlooked, leading to the inaccurate conclusion that
the number of miles food has travelled correlates very closely with the amount of resulting
GHG emissions. For example, one author recently asserted that “[f]ood miles are a good
indicator of the energy used to transport the food” without differentiating amongst modes of
transportation. Arielle Lessing, A Supplemental Labeling Regime for Organic Products: How
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act Hampers a Market Solution to an Organic Transparency
Problem, 18 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 415, 447 n.176 (2011).
57. See Rich Pirog et al., Food, Fuel, and Freeways: An Iowa Perspective on How Far
Food Travels, Fuel Usage, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, LEOPOLD CENTER FOR SUSTAINA-
BLE AGRIC. 15 (June, 2001), http://www.leopold.iastate.edu/pubs/staff/ppp/foodmiles.htm.
58. See Rich Pirog, Food Miles: A Simple Metaphor to Contrast Local and Global
Food Systems, HUNGER & ENVTL. NUTRITION NEWSL. (Hunger & Environmental Nutrition
Dietetic Practice Group, Carson City, NV), Summer 2004, at 1 (on file with authors). See also
Marne Coit, Jumping on the Next Bandwagon: An Overview of the Policy and Legal Aspects
of the Local Food Movement, 4 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 45, 52–54 (2008).
59. WTO Chief Hits Out at Food Miles, EUR. ENV’T & PACKAGING LAW, 22, 23 (2009)
[hereinafter WTO Chief].
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the GHG emissions associated with a food product, on a per unit basis, is
auto travel by the consumer driving to the shop or market and back.60
5. Transportation Contributes a Small Percentage of Food Sector GHG
While “food miles” proponents emphasize the link between distance
traveled and greenhouse gas emissions, in reality such gasses are not re-
leased solely—or even necessarily primarily—through transportation.61 In
fact, it is estimated that transportation accounts for only four percent of
the GHG emissions produced by the food sector.62 An analysis of food
production in the United States showed that the vast majority of GHG
emissions were due to the production of fertilizers and pesticides, and the
fuel used by equipment used on the farms and in the food processing
itself.63
If the goal is truly to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions associated
with food production, policies should consider the energy produced in the
entire life cycle of the foodstuffs, rather than solely on the transportation
component. Indeed, relying upon food miles as a policy driver would lead
to more local production, but likely also a higher level of greenhouse gas
emissions—precisely the opposite of the purported objective.
As an example, Kenyan farmers export green beans, particularly to
the United Kingdom. A simplistic calculus would say that because the im-
ported green beans travel a significant distance, the United Kingdom
should grow its own green beans. However, what that analysis would fail
to take into account is that Kenyans produce green beans with minimal
environmental impact. Kenyan farmers use manual labor rather than
mechanization and do not use commercial fertilizers.64 Furthermore, while
there are significant GHG emissions from air-freighting the beans from
Africa, the emissions per bean are more significant as a result of a con-
sumer driving six miles to purchase their portion of said beans.65
Furthermore, there is currently uncertainty as to the degree of varia-
tion in emissions from different types of soils and from lands used for dif-
ferent purposes.66 This uncertainty has led one scientist to proclaim that
60. See David Coley, Mark Howard & Michael Winter, Local Food, Food Miles and
Carbon Emissions: A Comparison of Farm Shop and Mass Distribution Approaches, 34
FOOD POL’Y 150, 154 (2009) (noting that carbon emissions should be measured per unit of
produce. The authors determined that if a consumer drove farther than 7.4 kilometers to
purchase organic vegetables from a farm market, the transaction would result in more GHG
emissions than if large-scale distribution systems, including cold storage are used, with the
produce delivered to the customer via a delivery truck that will serve many other customers
as well).
61. See Gareth Edwards-Jones, Food Miles Don’t Go the Distance, BBC NEWS, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4807026.stm (last updated Mar. 16, 2006, 9:41 PM).
62. WTO Chief, supra note 59, at 23.
63. See id.
64. See Robin McKie, How the Myth of Food Miles Hurts the Planet, THE GUARDIAN
(Mar. 22, 2008), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/mar/23/food.ethicalliving.
65. See generally Desrochers & Shimizu, supra note 55.
66. Edwards-Jones, supra note 61.
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“we do know enough to seriously question the scientific validity of simply
using food miles as a proxy for environmental damage.”67
B. Implications of Using Food Miles as a Proxy
for Environmental Harm
The fact that food miles are not necessarily a good indicator of the
energy expended to produce a product may be of little solace to Australia,
New Zealand and developing country exporters. The food miles message,
although flawed, is easy to understand and to convey.68 As such, it has the
potential to be used as a protectionist tool by competitors to fight off im-
ports coming from distant locales. Pascal Lamy has stated that “‘Green-
ery’ has become the new protectionism.”69 Even when the purpose may
not be protectionist, the effect will be to reduce imports that may in fact
have a lower carbon footprint than the local item. Walmart’s program de-
scribed above seems likely to fall into this category, as it appears the re-
tailer is seeking to buy local solely based on the food miles concept rather
than by taking into account other issues, such as amounts of fertilizer used,
type of transport involved, and need for greenhousing and mechanized
farming, that would factor into a life cycle analysis. In addition, Walmart’s
efforts to promote the planting of new types of crops in the United States
in the name of reducing food miles seem misguided.70 If an area has not
already been identified as particularly suitable to growing a particular
crop, it stands to reason that attempting to do so will require carbon-inten-
sive farming methods.
While activity such as Dairy Crest’s advertising appear to be privately
driven and thus not actionable in the WTO,71 its food miles-based cam-
paign may foreshadow government actions to come. As developed coun-
tries increasingly turn their attention to the problem of global climate
change, governments will increasingly seek to impose measures that re-
ward behaviors and purchasing practices that are perceived as lowering
carbon emissions in particular or merely as environmentally friendly in
general. It is also not hard to imagine that such measures could include
“buy local” campaigns not just with respect to food, but also for any other
product a country both produces domestically and imports. Today we hear
about food miles, but tomorrow perhaps there will be carbon taxes im-
posed upon imports coming from distant destinations. Furthermore, coun-
try of origin labeling requirements can be combined with “buy local” or
food miles campaigns to steer consumers away from imports. Government
representatives from several European countries have called for country
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Ballingall & Winchester, supra note 6, at 1201.
69. WTO Chief, supra note 59. See generally Kaplin, supra note 16.
70. See Walmart Produce: Our Commitment to You, supra note 9.
71. See Panel Report, Japan–Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Pa-
per, ¶¶ 10.43–10.56, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998) [hereinafter Japan–Film Panel Report]. See
also discussion infra Part III(A).
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of origin labeling on foods so that consumers could take environmental
effects into account in making their purchasing decisions.72 A government
adopting such measures may violate its World Trade Organization com-
mitments. Measures relating to food miles labeling would potentially
breach a number of different WTO provisions. In Part IV we analyze the
potential grounds for a WTO complaint based on a food miles-related
measure.
III. COULD A SUCCESSFUL WTO CHALLENGE BE MOUNTED
AGAINST FOOD MILES?
If a food miles labeling scheme operated within the jurisdiction of a
WTO member and was perceived to impinge upon the WTO rights of an-
other WTO member, or group of members, the aggrieved WTO members
would have the option of challenging the scheme pursuant to the WTO’s
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
The DSU sets out a structured procedure for the resolution of dis-
putes between WTO members. The procedure usually begins with consul-
tations between the members, which are required to be undertaken in
good faith upon the request of another WTO member.73 In the event that
consultations do not resolve the dispute within sixty days of their being
commenced, a WTO panel may be established to determine the dispute at
the request of the aggrieved member.74 The panel reports its findings to
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body,75 which then usually adopts the
panel’s report and requires compliance with its recommendations.76 Panel
reports can also be appealed to the WTO’s Appellate Body, which has the
power to review issues of law and the legal interpretations made by the
panel.77
To mount a challenge to a food miles scheme under the DSU, an ag-
grieved WTO member would first need to identify a relevant “measure” at
issue and then demonstrate that the measure at issue is attributable to a
WTO member government. It would then need to demonstrate that the
food miles labeling scheme violates a relevant WTO obligation. There are
a number of different WTO obligations that may be relevant to such a
scheme. These are discussed in detail below.
72. LINCOLN STUDY, supra note 30, at 6.
73. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
art. 4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, An-
nex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
74. Id. art. 6.
75. Id. art. 12.7.
76. Id. arts. 2.1, 16, 21.
77. Id. art. 17.6.
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A. Preliminary Requirements
1. What Is a “Measure”?
In order to challenge a food miles scheme, a WTO member would
need to identify the precise “measure” that is at issue.78 This has impor-
tant implications for the scope of a panel’s jurisdiction when adjudicating
the complaint.79
Article 3.3 of the DSU limits the use of dispute settlement procedures
to “situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it
directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by
measures taken by another Member.”80 Similarly, Article 6.2 of the DSU
requires that a request for the establishment of a panel “identify the spe-
cific measures at issue.”81
Although the DSU repeatedly uses the term “measure,” it does not
define what will (or will not) constitute a measure. Interpreting Article 3.3,
the Appellate Body has held that “[i]n principle, any act or omission at-
tributable to a WTO Member can be a measure of that Member for pur-
poses of dispute settlement proceedings.”82 Therefore, there are two
requirements for a “measure”: there must be an act or omission, and that
act or omission must be attributable to the relevant WTO member. Both
of these requirements will be considered in turn.
Act or omissions may include legislation, administrative decisions and
other legal instruments. Rules or norms of “general and prospective appli-
cation” may be challenged “as such” in the WTO, irrespective of whether
or how they have been applied in specific factual circumstances (i.e., a
facial challenge).83 In relation to “as such” challenges to legal instruments,
some GATT and WTO cases have drawn a distinction between so-called
mandatory and discretionary measures.84 The premise behind this distinc-
tion is that only measures that mandate conduct that would be inconsistent
with WTO obligations may be challenged as such; if a measure can be
implemented in a way that is consistent with the WTO agreements, then it
78. Note that nothing in the DSU enables private parties such as affected businesses to
bring disputes before a WTO panel. Rather, the dispute resolution mechanisms under the
DSU are only available to WTO members themselves—that is states and separate customs
territories possessing full autonomy in the conduct of their external commercial relations.
79. Tania Voon & Alan Yanovich, What is the Measure at Issue?, in CHALLENGES AND
PROSPECTS FOR THE WTO 115, 117 (Andrew D. Mitchell ed., 2005).
80. DSU, supra note 73, art. 3.3.
81. Id. art. 6.2.
82. Appellate Body Report, United States–Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, ¶ 81, WT/DS/244/AB/R (Dec.
15, 2003) [hereinafter U.S.–Corrosion-Resistant Steel Appellate Body Report].
83. Id., ¶ 82.
84. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States–1916 Act, ¶¶  88–91, WT/DS136/
AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000) (citing Panel Report, United States–Measures Af-
fecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS44/R, (Sept. 2, 2011)); Panel Re-
port, Canada–Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶ 9.124, WT/DS70/R (Apr.
14, 1999).
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is not able to be challenged as such, although it could be challenged as
applied. However, more recent jurisprudence suggests that the correct
question is not whether a measure is mandatory or discretionary, but
rather “whether, on the correct interpretation of the specific WTO obliga-
tion at issue, only mandatory or also discretionary national laws are pro-
hibited.”85 In other words, some discretionary measures can be subject to
“as such” challenges where it is determined that the WTO commitment at
issue can be violated by such a discretionary measure.
2. What Will be Attributable to a WTO Member?
The second aspect of identifying a measure that can be subject to
WTO dispute settlement procedures is that the relevant act or omission
must be attributable to a WTO member. The WTO only reaches actions of
a governmental nature; thus if a measure emanates from a private source
or cannot be attributed to the government, it will not be actionable under
WTO dispute settlement. While it is clear that acts of the executive, legis-
lative or judicial branches of government may be attributable to a WTO
member, issues have arisen when considering whether acts or omissions
involving regional or local governments, or private parties, may be attribu-
table to that member.
It is generally well established that the acts of regional or local govern-
ments can be attributed to a WTO member. For example, the United
States’ measures at issue in the U.S.–Gambling dispute included both fed-
eral and state laws.86 The DSU expressly provides that “the dispute settle-
ment provisions of the covered agreements may be invoked in respect of
measures affecting their observance taken by regional or local govern-
ments or authorities within the territory of a Member.”87 Likewise, under
the GATT, all WTO members are obliged to “take such reasonable mea-
sures as may be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of
this Agreement by the regional and local governments and authorities
within its territories.”88 In addition, the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
Agreement provides specific rules relating to the preparation, adoption
85. Panel Report, United States–Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act 1974, ¶¶ 7.51, 7.53,
WT/DS152/R, (Dec. 22, 1999). See also U.S.–Corrosion-Resistant Steel Appellate Body Re-
port, supra note 82, ¶¶ 87–99.
86. While the Appellate Body clearly accepted that state laws could be the basis of a
complaint under the DSU, it held that in relation to some of the state laws at issue Antigua
had not established a prima facie case of inconsistency with the relevant provisions of the
GATS. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Sup-
ply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶ 149–155, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinaf-
ter U.S.–Gambling Appellate Body Report].
87. DSU, supra note 73, art. 22.9.
88. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. XXIV:12, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S.
187; 33 I.L.M. 1153 [hereinafter GATT]. See e.g. Panel Report, European Communi-
ties–Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R
(Sept. 29, 2006); Request for Consultation by the European Communities, United
States–Measure Affecting Government Procurement, WT/DS88/1 (June 26, 1997).
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and application of measures by local government and non-government
bodies.89
The jurisprudence is less straightforward in relation to whether the
acts of private parties can be attributed to a WTO member. Whether a
private action may be attributable to a WTO member depends upon “dif-
ficult judgments as to the extent to which what appear on their face to be
private actions may nonetheless be attributable to a government because
of some governmental connection to or endorsement of those actions.”90
Because it is “difficult to establish bright-line rules in this regard,” whether
or not a measure can be attributed to that WTO member must “be ex-
amined on a case-by-case basis.”91 The relevant criteria is whether “there
is sufficient government involvement” for a measure to be attributable to
a WTO member.92 A number of cases have considered whether the mea-
sures at issue were attributable to the WTO member.
The panel in the Japan–Film dispute concluded that “administrative
guidance,” as it is known in Japan, was attributable to the government.93
Some of the specific instruments at issue in the dispute were produced by
private parties, such as an industry code of conduct and articles of associa-
tion for an industry body. For a number of these measures, the panel
found that approval by the relevant authority of the Japanese government
was an indication that there was a sufficient connection for the measures
to be attributable to the government.94 Yet approval by the government is
not a necessary condition for a measure to be attributable to that WTO
member. Some “self-regulating measures” were attributed to the Japanese
government “[r]egardless of whether [they] were in fact formally ap-
proved,” because of the likelihood that private parties would conform with
the measures and consider them to be “administrative guidance.”95
In Canada–Autos, the panel considered whether the actions of private
parties could be subject to Article III:4 of the GATT. It noted that:
A determination of whether private action amounts to a ‘require-
ment’ under Article III:4 must therefore necessarily rest on a find-
ing that there is a nexus between that action and the action of a
government such that the government must be held responsible
for that action. We do not believe that such a nexus can exist only
if a government makes undertakings of private parties legally en-
forceable . . . it is necessary to take into account that there is a
89. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade arts. 3, 4, 7, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 (entered
into force Jan. 1, 1995)  [hereinafter TBT Agreement] available at http://www.wto.org/en-
glish/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm.
90. Japan–Film Panel Report, supra note 71, ¶ 10.52.
91. Id. ¶ 10.56.
92. Id.
93. Id. ¶¶ 10.43–46.
94. Id. ¶ 10.328.
95. Id. ¶ 10.299.
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broad variety of forms of government action that can be effective
in influencing the conduct of private parties.96
The measures at issue in this case were undertakings by car manufacturers
operating in Canada, which, if complied with, entitled them to an exemp-
tion from the usually applicable customs duties on imports of motor vehi-
cles. The panel held that these undertakings constituted “requirements”
for the purposes of Article III:4 of the GATT, because:
[w]here a government requests a firm to make commitments as
specific as those contained in the Letters of Undertaking and to
record them in writing in letters addressed to the government, and
these commitments are described by the firms as “obligations” in
respect of the fulfillment of which they undertake to provide in-
formation to, and to consult with, the government, it is evident
that there is action of private parties directed by, or at the very
least expected by, the government.97
In Canada–Dairy, the panel held that marketing boards, which were cor-
porations made up of dairy producers, were governmental agencies, to the
extent that they acted under “explicit delegated governmental author-
ity.”98 The Appellate Body upheld this finding, stating that “[i]rrespective
of the composition of the boards, the source of their powers is still ‘gov-
ernments’ and the nature of the functions that they exercise is still
‘governmental’.”99
On the basis of these decisions it can be seen that dispute settlement
panels and the Appellate Body are willing to find that the acts of private
bodies can be attributed to the relevant WTO member government. How-
ever, one case in which such a claim was not successful was Argen-
tina–Hides and Leather.100 The European Communities challenged the
fact that Argentina allowed representatives from its domestic leather tan-
ning industry to be present at the customs clearance of exports of raw
bovine hides.101 While there was a legally binding resolution authorizing
the industry members to be present at customs, the panel rejected the no-
tion that Article XI:1 of the GATT required WTO members “to exclude
any possibility that governmental measures may enable private parties, di-
rectly or indirectly, to restrict trade, where those measures themselves are
96. Panel Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, ¶
10.107, WT/DS139/R (Feb. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Canada–Autos Panel Report].
97. Id. ¶ 10.123.
98. Panel Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting Dairy Exports, ¶ 7.78, WT/
DS103/R (May 17, 1999).
99. Appellate Body Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting Dairy Exports, ¶ 101,
WT/DS103/AB/R (Oct. 13, 1999).
100. Panel Report, Argentina–Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the
Import of Finished Leather, WT/DS155/R (Dec. 19, 2000).
101. Id. ¶ 3.1.
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not trade-restrictive.”102 The panel went on to conclude that there was
insufficient evidence to establish that the presence of the industry repre-
sentatives were effectively an export restriction.103
These cases demonstrate that private acts may be attributable to the
government of a WTO member if sufficient government involvement can
be proven. This government involvement may constitute approval of the
act, delegation of authority to the private body or acts being carried out in
accordance with a commitment made to the government.
3. Application to Food Miles
A food miles scheme could be challenged on the basis of its applica-
tion in a specific case, such as harm to a particular imported product that
can be linked to food miles, or the scheme as a whole could be challenged
on the basis that it violates relevant provisions of WTO law. If a challenge
is made to a food miles scheme “as such,” then the complaining member
will have to establish whether the relevant provisions of the WTO Agree-
ments prohibit both mandatory and discretionary measures. This is dis-
cussed below in relation to relevant provisions of the TBT Agreement and
the GATT.
The key issue for whether a food miles scheme is a “measure” under
the DSU will be whether there is sufficient government involvement in the
scheme to make it attributable to that WTO member. Most food miles
schemes, which have been implemented to date, have originated from pri-
vate bodies, without authorization or official support from govern-
ments.104 For example, the Sydney Fair Food Alliance, which promotes
the purchase of locally produced food with a low miles tally, is an indepen-
dent community group.105 Private companies such as Tesco and Marks &
Spencer have developed labeling schemes for their own products, which
have been implemented in the United Kingdom, for example by marking
food that has been air freighted with an airplane symbol.106 Based on the
jurisprudence, it is difficult to see how these sorts of programs could be
attributed to WTO members.
Nonetheless, there are some private carbon labeling schemes, which
are receiving government support. In France, certain supermarket labeling
schemes have been endorsed by the French Environment and Energy
Agency.107 However, no audits of the scheme are required so it is arguable
whether the government endorsement of the scheme has a meaningful im-
pact on its implementation. The more direct the linkages between the gov-
102. Id. ¶ 11.19.
103. Id. ¶ 11.35.
104. See ABARE Report, supra note 8, at 18.
105. See Annual Report 2010-2011, SYDNEY FOOD FAIRNESS ALLIANCE (Feb. 14, 2012),
sydneyfoodfairness.org.au/blog/2012/02/14/annual-report-2010-2011/.
106. Caroline Saunders, Carbon Footprints, Life Cycle Analysis, Food Miles–Global
Trade Trends and Market Issues, 60 POL. SCI. 73 (2008).
107. ABARE Report, supra note 8, at 22.
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ernment and a food miles scheme, the more these may be measures that
could be subject to challenge pursuant to the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism.
B. Possible Bases for a Challenge to Food Miles
There are a range of WTO obligations that may be relevant to cam-
paigns or policies based on the concept of food miles. The particular WTO
obligations that may be at issue would depend upon the characteristics of
the relevant food miles policy. For example, if an eco-label which reports
the food miles for that produce or product constituted a “measure” attrib-
utable to a WTO member, it could raise issues under the GATT and the
TBT Agreement. A differential tariff or carbon tax levied in proportion to
the food miles of a product may be inconsistent with GATT obligations. It
is also possible that food miles schemes could be viewed as a subsidy for
local produce, implicating the provisions of the Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures (SCM) Agreement.
The WTO obligations that apply to a food miles program may also
depend on whether or not participation in the program is voluntary or
mandatory. Mandatory schemes may be subject to GATT provisions,
while voluntary schemes most likely will not be subject to those
obligations.108
A food miles labeling scheme could implicate multiple WTO agree-
ments, including the GATT, the TBT Agreement, and the SCM Agree-
ment. There is a degree of overlap between the TBT Agreement and the
GATT, in that TBT measures are also GATT measures (although not all
GATT measures are TBT measures). As such, there are certain measures
to which both the GATT and the TBT Agreement apply. Because the
TBT Agreement sets out detailed rules to govern technical barriers to
trade, WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body begin their
analysis of such a measure with the TBT Agreement, and subsequently
assess the measure under the GATT.109 Accordingly, we first assess the
possibility of challenging a food miles labeling scheme under the TBT
Agreement before turning to the GATT and other possible bases for
challenge.
108. CENTER FOR INT’L ENVTL. L., ECO-LABELING STANDARDS, GREEN PROCURE-
MENT AND THE WTO: SIGNIFICANCE FOR WORLD BANK BORROWERS 5 (2005) available at
www.ciel.org/Publications/Ecolabeling_WTO_Mar05.pdf (noting that the GATT may apply
to mandatory eco-labeling schemes). The TBT Agreement, however, covers both mandatory
and voluntary measures.
109. See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Products Containing Asbestos, ¶ 8.16, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000). In addition, in the un-
likely event of a conflict between the GATT and the TBT Agreement, the TBT Agreement
interpretation would prevail. See General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A of the WTO Agree-
ment, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/wto_agree_04_e
.htm#general (last visited May 15, 2014).
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1. TBT Agreement
Until recently, very few matters brought before the WTO dispute set-
tlement system had implicated the TBT Agreement. As a result, there was
little jurisprudence on the interpretation of this Agreement. Prior to 2012,
only two TBT disputes, the 2001 EC–Asbestos110 case and the 2002
EC–Sardines111 case, had been appealed to the Appellate Body. A third,
the 2005 EC–Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia) dis-
pute, was resolved at the panel level.112
In the past few years, however, WTO members brought three differ-
ent disputes implicating the TBT Agreement, including important provi-
sions of the agreement that had not been interpreted in the previous
disputes. All three were adjudicated at both the panel and Appellate Body
levels, with the Appellate Body issuing its reports in each of these disputes
in 2012. Through these decisions, U.S.–Clove Cigarettes;113 U.S.–Tuna II
(Mexico);114 and U.S.–Country of Origin Labelling (“U.S.–COOL”),115
the Appellate Body has developed a consistent approach to TBT cases
that will inform future jurisprudence. These three decisions collectively
provide us with useful indicia for how a panel or the Appellate Body
would be likely to approach a challenge of a measure based on food
miles.116
110. Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Products Containing Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC–Asbestos
Appellate Body Report].
111. Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Trade Description of Sardines,
WT/DS231/AB/R (Sep. 26, 2002) [hereinafter EC–Sardines Appellate Body Report].
112. Panel Report, European Communities–Protection of Trademarks and Geographi-
cal Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS290/R (Mar. 15, 2005) [here-
inafter EC–Trademarks and Geographical Indications Panel Report].
113. Appellate Body Report, United States–Measures Affecting the Production and Sale
of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter U.S.–Clove Cigarettes Ap-
pellate Body Report].
114. Appellate Body Report, United States–Measures Concerning the Importation, Mar-
keting and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012) [hereinafter
U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report].
115. Appellate Body Report, United States–Certain Country of Origin Labeling
(COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/AB/R, WT/DS386/AB/R (Jun. 29, 2012) [hereinafter
U.S.–COOL Appellate Body Report].
116. Two of these disputes (U.S.–COOL and U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico)) implicated prod-
uct labeling. The COOL regulation was intended to provide consumers with information
about the origin of meat sold in the United States. While the purpose of this regulation was
purportedly to spur foreign meat exporters to improve the safety of their products (on the
theory that if customers know where their meat comes from, they will make purchasing deci-
sions based on perceived safety), these labels would also signal to customers whether meat
was domestic or had, perhaps, traveled a significant distance. Thus, while the COOL case did
not implicate food miles explicitly, the labels used would have the potential to lead consum-
ers to make decisions on a “distance travelled” basis. See Jason J. Czarnezki, The Future of
Food Eco-Labeling: Organic, Carbon Footprint, and Environmental Life-Cycle Analysis, 30
STANFORD ENVTL. L.J. 3, 22 (2011).
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a. Scope of the TBT Agreement
Labeling requirements based on food miles could potentially fall
within the coverage of the TBT Agreement. The Agreement applies to 1)
technical regulations; 2) standards; and 3) conformity assessment proce-
dures.117 For purposes of this discussion, we focus on the “technical regu-
lations” and “standards” categories.118
As is explained in more detail below, technical regulations are
mandatory. Examples would include a requirement that any food that con-
tains GMOs bear a label so indicating, or a regulation mandating that all
electric appliances display a measure, based on a standardized system, of
their energy efficiency. Standards are voluntary, meaning that use of, e.g.,
a label, is not required. However, if a label is used, it must conform to
particular criteria. For example, countries generally do not require that
organic foods be labelled as such; however, they may wish to attach condi-
tions to the use of labels indicating a product is organic. A regulation set-
ting forth the criteria pursuant to which the term “organic” can be applied
would, in this instance, be a standard for purposes of the TBT Agreement,
rather than a technical regulation. Producers and retailers would not be
obliged to label any products organic, but if they did wish to use the term
“organic” on their products, they would need to comply with the country’s
regulation.
Technical regulations are defined in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agree-
ment, which provides that a technical regulation is a:
[d]ocument which lays down product characteristics or their re-
lated processes and production methods, including the applicable
administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It
may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols,
packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a
product, process or production method.119
The Appellate Body has interpreted Annex 1.1 as requiring three cu-
mulative findings in order for a measure to be a technical regulation: a) it
must apply to an identifiable product or group of products; b) it must iden-
tify one or more characteristics of the product; and c) compliance with the
product characteristic(s) must be mandatory.120
With respect to food miles labeling, the first requirement would likely
be met. Any measure relating to food miles labeling would presumably
117. See TBT Agreement, supra note 89, arts. 2–5.
118. Id., Annex 1.3 (“Any procedure used, directly or indirectly, to determine that rele-
vant requirements in technical regulations or standards are fulfilled.”). It is possible a food
miles labeling program could implicate this provision—for example, if the measure pre-
scribed methods for calculating the food miles listed on the label. Nonetheless, we limit our
focus here to technical regulations and standards themselves.
119. Id., Annex 1.1.
120. EC–Sardines Appellate Body Report, supra note 111, ¶ 176. See also EC–Asbestos
Appellate Body Report, supra note 110, ¶¶ 66–70; U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body
Report, supra note 114, ¶ 183.
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identify the categories of food—e.g. “all perishable foods”; “all fresh fruits
and vegetables”; “all air-freighted produce”—to which the labels would
apply. Thus the applicable products would be foods or some subset
thereof.
In EC–Asbestos, the Appellate Body established that product charac-
teristics can be intrinsic or extrinsic to the product and can be positive or
negative in nature.121 The Appellate Body noted the language of Annex
1.1, which provides that product characteristics “may also include or deal
exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling re-
quirements as they apply to a product, process or production method.”122
Annex 1.1 therefore suggests that a labeling requirement may itself be
a product characteristic. This was the interpretation reached in the
EC–Geographical Indications case, where the panel found that “a docu-
ment that lays down a requirement that a product label must contain a
particular detail, in fact, lays down a product characteristic.”123
What is not entirely clear is whether the “particular detail” that is re-
quired to appear on a label can be unrelated to the product itself. It seems
straightforward that a regulation providing that labels must identify char-
acteristics linked to the product itself, such as calorie count, nutritional
content, or allergenic properties, would satisfy this requirement. But what
if the mandate is that a label state that food has been air-freighted, or that
an airplane sticker be placed on air-freighted food? Will this constitute a
product characteristic?
In other words, Annex 1.1 clearly includes “related” processes or pro-
duction methods (PPMs), but does it include non-product-related process
and production methods (npr-PPMs) as well? The distance food has trav-
elled, or the method by which it was transported, cannot be detected by
analyzing the food itself and is therefore an unincorporated or non-prod-
uct-related PPM.
The first sentence of Annex 1.1 refers to documents setting out “prod-
uct characteristics or their related processes and production methods”
(emphasis added), but in the second sentence, which discusses labeling,
the text uses different language, omitting the word “related”: “It may in-
clude. . . labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or pro-
duction method.”124
121. EC–Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 110, ¶ 67.
122. TBT Agreement, supra note 89, Annex 1.1.
123. EC–Trademarks and Geographical Indications Panel Report, supra note 112, ¶
4.751.
124. TBT Agreement, supra note 89, Annex 1.2. Dealing with “standards,” utilizes the
same pattern. A “standard” is a:
[d]ocument approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and re-
peated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes
and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also
include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or label-
ling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method.
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The omission of the word “related” in the second sentence can be read
to indicate that the TBT Agreement does cover npr-PPMs, at least with
respect to labeling.125 Although not all commentators share this view,126
we find it telling that the United States, as respondent in the U.S.–COOL
and U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) disputes, did not raise the argument that its
labeling requirements – in both cases relating to npr-PPMs—fell outside
the scope of the TBT Agreement.127
The third requirement is that the regulation must prohibit or require
certain product characteristics.128 Although each measure must be ex-
amined in the light of its unique circumstances,129 a regulation that re-
quired labels to note the distance the product had travelled from origin to
market, or to depict an airplane, would seem to fall squarely within this
category.130
As noted above, “standards” is the term the TBT Agreement uses for
TBT measures that are voluntary. Voluntary measures are less burden-
some on exporters than mandatory ones, and it is therefore understanda-
ble that the TBT Agreement imposes less stringent requirements on the
use of standards than it does on the use of technical regulations. For stan-
dards, WTO members are to ensure their standardizing bodies accept and
comply with the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and
125. See Tania Voon, Andrew Mitchell & Catherine Gascoigne, Consumer Information,
Consumer Preferences and Product Labels Under the TBT Agreement, in RESEARCH HAND-
BOOK ON THE WTO AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 454 (Tracey Epps & Michael J.
Trebilcock eds., 2013).
126. See Vicki Waye, Carbon Footprints, Food Miles and the Australian Wine Industry, 9
MELB. J. INT’L L. 271, 298 (2008); Arthur E. Appleton, Private Climate Change Standards
and Labeling Schemes under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, in INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE REGULATION AND THE MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 150 (Thomas
Cottier, Olga Nartova & Sadeq Z. Bigdeli eds., 2009) [hereinafter Appleton—Private Stan-
dards] (“the TBT probably does not apply to standards governing NPR-PPMs.”). See also
Committee on Trade and the Environment, Note by the Secretariat: Negotiating History of the
Coverage of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade with regard to Labelling Require-
ments, Voluntary Standards, and Processes and Production Methods Unrelated to Product
Characteristics, WT/CTE/W/10, G/TBT/W/11 (August 29, 1995); Arthur Appleton, Super-
market Labels and the TBT Agreement: “Mind the Gap”, BUS. LAW BRIEF, Fall 2007, at 11-12;
Manoj Joshi, Are Eco-labels Consistent with World Trade Agreements?, 38 J. WORLD TRADE
69, 74-78 (2004).
127. See PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 855 (2012).
128. EC–Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 112, ¶¶ 66–70.
129. U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, supra note 114, ¶ 188.
130. There was no dispute over whether the primary measures at issue were technical
regulations in U.S.–Clove Cigarettes or U.S.–COOL. In U.S.–COOL, there was an issue at
the panel stage as to whether a letter written by the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Tom
Vilsack, was a technical regulation. The panel found that the letter did not meet the defini-
tion of a technical regulation because compliance with the suggestions made in the letter was
not mandatory. This finding was not appealed. Panel Report, United States–Certain Country
of Origin Labeling (COOL) Requirements, ¶ 7.194, WT/DS384/R (Nov. 18, 2011) [hereinaf-
ter U.S.–COOL Panel Report].
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Application of Standards set forth in Annex 3 of the Agreement.131 In
addition, “Members shall not take measures which have the effect of, di-
rectly or indirectly, requiring or encouraging such standardizing bodies to
act in a manner inconsistent with the Code of Good Practice.”132 So long
as a member’s standardizing bodies accept and comply with the Code of
Good Practice, their standards will be deemed consistent with the TBT
Agreement.133
Because the TBT Agreement requirements for standards are easier to
satisfy than those for technical regulations, members likely will try to ar-
gue measures are voluntary (and thus standards) rather than mandatory
(and thus technical regulations) if they have the opportunity to do so. The
Appellate Body faced such a situation in the recent U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico)
case.134
iii. Labeling Requirements can be Technical Measures or Standards,
Depending on the Facts
At issue in the U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) dispute was the U.S. labeling
scheme pursuant to the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act
(DPCIA) and related regulations. Under DPCIA, a dolphin-safe label
could be used on tuna and tuna products only if the tuna had been caught
without using certain fishing techniques believed to result in dolphin mor-
talities, including high seas driftnet fishing.135 In addition, different criteria
were required to qualify for the dolphin-safe label for tuna caught within
and outside the Eastern Tropical Pacific region.136
The panel found that the U.S. requirements were mandatory, and
therefore constituted a technical regulation under TBT Annex 1.1. In sup-
port of this conclusion, the panel noted that the “dolphin-safe” labeling
provisions are subject to enforcement measures, and dictate the circum-
stances under which certain terms can be used on tuna product labels.137
The panel concluded that compliance with the labeling requirements is
mandatory,138 and for these reasons the requirements constituted a techni-
cal regulation. The United States appealed this finding, arguing that the
panel had improperly equated “requirement” with “mandatory.” It sub-
mitted that the mere fact the labeling requirements were enforceable did
not mean they were mandatory, as enforceability, on its own, does not
131. TBT Agreement, supra note 89, art. 4.1.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, supra note 114.
135. Panel Report, United States–Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and
Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶¶ 2.3–2.8, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter
U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) Panel Report]
136. Id. ¶¶ 2.9–2.16.
137. Id. ¶¶ 7.127, 7.132. See also U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, supra
note 114, ¶¶ 179–180.
138. U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) Panel Report, supra note 135, ¶ 7.145.
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differentiate standards from technical regulations.139 The United States
argued the labeling scheme was not mandatory, as producers were not
prohibited from selling their tuna on the market if they did not meet the
requirements for using the dolphin-safe label. Instead, they could still sell
their tuna; however, they would not be allowed to call the tuna “dolphin-
safe.”140 Mexico argued that the labeling requirements should be seen as
mandatory because the only way to be able to convey tuna products were
“dolphin-safe” in the U.S. market was to comply with the conditions asso-
ciated with using the “dolphin-safe” label, and then to use that label. No
alternative labels were permitted, nor could one fail to comply with the
conditions imposed for using the label and still use the label.141
The Appellate Body noted that labeling requirements may be techni-
cal regulations or standards, and stated that “[t]he fact that ‘labelling re-
quirements’ may consist of criteria or conditions that must be complied
with in order to use a particular label does not imply therefore that the
measure is for that reason alone a ‘technical regulation’ within the mean-
ing of Annex 1.1.”142 Instead, the characteristics of the measure and the
given circumstances of a particular situation would need to be examined to
determine whether a labeling requirement is a technical regulation or a
standard.143 In this respect, it agreed with the position of the United
States. However, the Appellate Body went on to uphold the finding of the
panel, substantially agreeing with Mexico’s argument. It found: “the US
measure establishes a single and legally mandated set of requirements for
making any statement with respect to the broad subject of “dolphin-
safety” of tuna products in the United States.”144 The Appellate Body also
pointed to the fact that the U.S. law provided for enforcement measures in
the event a label claimed tuna was “dolphin-safe” or referenced marine
mammals at all, if it did not comply with the measure at issue. These en-
forcement measures would apply even if such a label was not inaccurate or
misleading.145
The Appellate Body’s reasoning suggests that many regulations will
fall into the category of “mandatory,” notwithstanding the fact that the
affected product can be sold without complying with the measure’s provi-
sions. Although it seems likely that most food miles labels would be volun-
tary standards under the TBT Agreement rather than mandatory technical
regulations, the Appellate Body’s findings in U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) sug-
gest that the “voluntary” category will be interpreted more narrowly than
139. U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, supra note 114, ¶ 181.
140. Id. ¶ 196.
141. Id. ¶ 182.
142. Id. ¶ 187.
143. Id. ¶¶ 188, 190.
144. Id. ¶ 193.
145. Id. ¶ 195.
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previously understood, while the “mandatory” category will be interpreted
more broadly.146
Relevant Provisions – Standards
The main TBT Agreement provisions pertaining to voluntary stan-
dards are Annex 3, which comprises the aforementioned Code of Good
Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards
(“Code of Good Practice”), and Article 4. As noted above, if a food miles
labeling scheme (or a regulation governing the use of life cycle analysis
data) were deemed a standard, the primary determinant of WTO consis-
tency will be whether the member’s standardizing bodies have accepted
and are following the Code of Good Practice.147 The Code of Good Prac-
tice requires standards-setting bodies to provide most-favored nation and
national treatment with respect to standards, and to refrain from imposing
unnecessary obstacles to trade.148 In addition, the Code of Good Practice
requires that:
[w]here international standards exist or their completion is immi-
nent, the standardizing body shall use them, or the relevant parts
of them, as a basis for the standards it develops, except where
such international standards or relevant parts would be ineffective
or inappropriate, for instance, because of an insufficient level of
protection or fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fun-
damental technological problems.149
As discussed above, an issue arose in U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) over
whether the measure was a standard or a technical regulation, with the
Appellate Body determining the U.S. measure was a technical regulation.
The other five TBT disputes to date have all concerned technical regula-
tions rather than standards. While there were questions in certain of the
cases as to whether the measures at issue were technical regulations, the
arguments revolved around the TBT provisions governing technical regu-
lations rather than whether the measures were instead standards.
Because the Appellate Body seems to be defining standards narrowly,
and that the instances of proposed food miles labeling to date have been
mandatory in nature, we focus here on the requirements a member must
comply with in applying (mandatory) technical regulations rather than
(voluntary) standards.
146. See Elizabeth Trujillo, The WTO Appellate Body Knocks Down U.S. “Dolphin-
Safe” Tuna Labels But Leaves a Crack for PPMs, ASIL INSIGHTS, July 26, 2012, available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/25/wto-appellate-body-knocks-down-us-%E2%
80%9Cdolphin-safe%E2%80%9D-tuna-labels-leaves.
147. TBT Agreement, supra note 89, art. 4.2.
148. Id. Annexes 3(D) & (E). Most-favored nation and national treatment are dis-
cussed infra Part III(B)(1)(c)(i).
149. Id. Annex 3(F). The Code of Good Practice additionally has certain transparency
and reporting requirements.
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Relevant Provisions – Technical Regulations
The most important TBT Agreement provisions relating to technical
regulations are the requirements to provide most-favored nation (MFN)
and national treatment (Article 2.1); the requirement not to erect unneces-
sary barriers to trade (Article 2.2); and the requirement to base technical
barriers to trade on international standards, where such standards exist
(Article 2.4). We discuss each of these in turn.
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement provides:
Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations,
products imported from the territory of any Member shall be ac-
corded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like
products of national origin and to like products originating in any
other country.150
In U.S.–COOL, the Appellate Body identified three elements that
must be established to demonstrate a violation of the national treatment
obligation enshrined in TBT Art. 2.1:
(i) that the measure at issue is a ‘technical regulation’ as that term
is defined in Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement; (ii) that the im-
ported and domestic products at issue are ‘like products’; and (iii)
that the measure at issue accords less favourable treatment to im-
ported products than to like domestic products.151
The test for a violation of the MFN principle is similar, except that the
third element asks whether the measure accords “treatment no less fa-
vourable” than like products originating in third countries, rather than
originating in the domestic market.152
A food miles labeling requirement could implicate the national treat-
ment obligation and the MFN obligation. For example, if a WTO member
imposed a labeling measure that required a listing of the distance fresh
foods had traveled, such a measure could lead to concerns over disparate
treatment for domestic and imported products, implicating the national
treatment provision. It also could implicate the MFN principle if the mem-
ber imposing the measure imported like products from a geographically
distant trading partner as well as from neighboring countries. This scenario
could lead to claims that certain trading partners (those geographically
proximate to the member imposing the measure) are receiving more
favorable treatment than others (those located further away). Accord-
ingly, the analysis below applies to potential claims of violation of both the
national treatment and MFN obligations.
150. TBT Agreement, supra note 89, art. 2.1.
151. U.S.–COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 115, ¶ 267; see also U.S.–Clove
Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 113, ¶ 87.
152. U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, supra note 114, ¶ 202.
608 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 35:579
Looking to the three-part test set forth above, we have already dis-
cussed above the issue of when a measure will be deemed a technical regu-
lation. We therefore focus here on the remaining two issues—whether the
domestic and imported products are “like,” and whether imported prod-
ucts receive less favorable treatment than domestic products (in the case
of the national treatment obligation) or other imported products (in the
case of the MFN obligation).
The concept of “like products” features throughout the WTO agree-
ments. Differential treatment of dissimilar products is commonplace and
largely uncontroversial. If a member decides to impose higher tariffs on
clothing than on cars, for example, that is a matter of domestic policy with
which the WTO is not concerned. However, what is a matter for concern is
when a member provides different treatment to two products that are the
same, or close to the same—e.g. cars from member A receiving better
treatment than cars from member B.
Panels and the Appellate Body have traditionally used four criteria to
assess whether products are “like”: physical properties; end-uses; con-
sumer-preferences; and tariff classification.153 Further, in relation to TBT
Article 2.1 the Appellate Body has clarified that “likeness” should be un-
derstood in the same way as it has been interpreted under GATT Article
III:4—that is, more broadly, as “a determination about the nature and ex-
tent of a competitive relationship between and among the products at is-
sue.”154 The regulatory purpose is not relevant per se to the determination
of likeness155 (although it may be reflected in the traditional likeness crite-
ria and may also be relevant to the question of less favorable treatment
under TBT Article 2.1 and legitimate objective under TBT Article 2.2, as
discussed further below).
It is difficult to see how, under a test emphasizing the extent of a com-
petitive relationship, products that are differentiated only by food miles
would not be considered to be like products. While there may be some
difference in consumer preferences for products with a low food mile tally,
studies suggest that the majority of consumers are not generally influenced
by environmental considerations when selecting food products.156 If food
products are otherwise like and share the same physical properties, end-
uses and tariff classification, then it is prima facie probable that they would
be found to be like products in relation to TBT Article 2.1.
153. EC–Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 110, ¶ 101; Appellate Body Re-
port, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 21, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS/10/AB/R, WT/DS11/
AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Japan–Alcoholic Beverages II Appellate Body Report].
154. U.S.–Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 113, ¶ 120. In U.S.–Tuna
II (Mexico), the Panel found that US, Mexican, and other imported tuna products were “like
products”; this finding was not appealed. See U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report,
supra note 114, ¶ 202. In relation to GATT Article III:4, see EC–Asbestos Appellate Body
Report, supra note 110, ¶ 99.
155. See, e.g., U.S.–Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 113, ¶ 116.
156. Waye, supra note 126, at 290.
Spring 2014] Food Miles 609
Thus, in the context of food miles labeling schemes that would require
listing the distance perishable items have travelled or that an airplane
sticker be placed on air-freighted produce, such measures would have the
potential to impose different requirements on like products. For example,
air-freighted imported flowers would need to display an airplane sticker,
whereas the identical varietal of flower that was shipped by truck from a
foreign country or from within the country would not need to display a
sticker. The question then becomes, however, whether there is a legal ba-
sis for categorizing those two sets of flowers as “unlike” because of their
non-product related processes and production methods (npr-PPMs).157
There is general disagreement among WTO members as to whether
npr-PPMs, such as the sustainability or energy intensity of production
methods, can be considered as a valid basis for distinguishing between oth-
erwise like products.158 But even if it were to be accepted that npr-PPMs
could constitute a valid basis upon which to distinguish between products,
food miles may not even be considered a PPM in the strict sense.
Food miles do not equate to how a product is manufactured or
processed, but simply to how far the product has travelled (without even
necessarily considering the greenhouse gas intensity of the mode of trans-
portation). They literally distinguish between products based only on the
distance from their country of origin to the country importing the goods.
As a result, it is highly unlikely that a WTO panel or the Appellate Body
would hold that food miles render food products “unlike,” as doing so
would in effect be declaring that products are not like just because they
originate in different WTO members.
To the extent food miles would be considered an npr-PPM, and to the
extent npr-PPMs are a relevant consideration under the TBT Agreement,
food miles may not render products unlike. As noted, one of the likeness
criteria is consumer preferences. Although when surveyed, consumers in-
dicate a preference for products with lower food miles, consumers’ actual
buying habits suggest that the food miles labeling used in the United King-
dom has not influenced consumer choices.159 As such, the data do not, at
present, reflect a consumer preference for low food miles products.
In the recent U.S.–Clove Cigarettes case, the Appellate Body indicated
that its previous jurisprudence regarding the meaning of “treatment no
less favourable” in the Article III:4 context was “instructive” in interpret-
ing this same language in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.160 The Ap-
pellate Body went on to draw from its GATT Article III:4 analysis from
157. For purposes of this discussion, we assume npr-PPMs are covered by the TBT
Agreement. However, as discussed supra, at Part IV(B)(1)(i)(b), this is subject to debate.
158. See ECO-LABELING STANDARDS, GREEN PROCUREMENT AND THE WTO: SIGNIFI-
CANCE FOR WORLD BANK BORROWERS, supra note 108; Joshi, supra note 126, at 74–78, 87.
159. AGRICULTURE AND AGRI-FOOD CANADA, THE UNITED KINGDOM FOOD AND
BEVERAGE INDUSTRY FACTS AND TRENDS (Feb., 2011), available at http://www.ats-sea.agr.gc
.ca/eur/pdf/5730-eng.pdf (Tesco and Marks & Spencer reported that the airplane labels did
not have an impact on sales).
160. U.S.–Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 113, ¶ 180.
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Korea–Beef, using language similar to that ruling in explaining that in as-
sessing a claim under TBT Article 2.1, a panel “should seek to ascertain
whether the technical regulation at issue modifies the conditions of com-
petition in the market of the regulating Member to the detriment of the
group of imported products. . .”.161
However, the Appellate Body did not stop its analysis here, indicating
that in order to find a violation of TBT Article 2.1, something more may
be required than what is needed to find a violation of GATT Article III:4.
The Appellate Body indicated that, while Article 2.1 prohibits both de jure
and de facto discrimination, in the case of de facto discrimination, “the
existence of detrimental impact on competitive opportunities for the
group of imported vis-a`-vis the group of domestic like products is not dis-
positive of less favorable treatment under Article 2.1.”162 Instead, the
panel must additionally query whether the detrimental impact on imports
“stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction”.163 To make
this determination, a panel should:
Carefully scrutinize the . . . design, architecture, revealing struc-
ture, operation, and application of the technical regulation at is-
sue, and in particular, whether that technical regulation is even-
handed, in order to determine whether it discriminates against the
group of imported products.164
This additional inquiry—asking whether unfavorable treatment can be
explained by a legitimate regulatory distinction—may seem, on the sur-
face, to create a different standard for GATT Article III:4 and TBT Arti-
cle 2.1 However, the additional step in fact appears to be intended to align
the GATT and TBT jurisprudence by building into the TBT analysis a
consideration of GATT Article XX-style considerations.165 Indeed, the
Appellate Body noted that, while the TBT Agreement does not include a
general exceptions provision akin to GATT Article XX, the TBT Agree-
ment preamble contains language quite similar to the GATT exceptions
provision. In particular, the sixth recital of the preamble provides:
Recognizing that no country should be prevented from taking
measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the
protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the environ-
ment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the levels it
161. Id.
162. Id. ¶ 182.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. GATT Article XX is the general exceptions provision of the GATT. See also
Joshua Meltzer, The WTO Ruling on U.S. Country of Origin Labelling (“COOL”), ASIL
INSIGHTS, July 18, 2012, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/23/wto-rul
ing-us-country-origin-labeling-%E2%80%9Ccool%E2%80%9D (“the absence of an equiva-
lent [to Article XX] exceptions provision in the TBT Agreement is what drives the AB’s
approach in this case.”); U.S.–Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 113, ¶ 109.
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considers appropriate, subject to the requirement that they are
not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbi-
trary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international
trade, and are otherwise in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement. . .166
The Appellate Body has stated that the preamble to the TBT Agree-
ment is relevant context167 for interpreting TBT Article 2.1.168 Thus, if a
food miles labeling requirement were to have a detrimental impact on the
competitive activities of imported foods relative to domestic foods, we
would still need to consider whether this disadvantage stems exclusively
from a “legitimate regulatory distinction”. In U.S.–COOL, the Appellate
Body elaborated, indicating that a distinction will not be deemed legiti-
mate where it “is not designed and applied in an even-handed manner –
because, for example, it is designed or applied in a matter that constitutes
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination . . .”169
In the first instance, exporters might have difficulty demonstrating the
detrimental effects caused by food miles labeling requirements. There is
data to suggest that customers have not changed their purchasing patterns
following the introduction of airplane label stickers on imported pro-
duce.170 However, this data is several years old. As consumers are exposed
to negative messages about food miles over a longer period of time, their
behaviors may shift.
Assuming that detrimental effects could be shown, exporters required
to affix food miles labels to their products would seemingly have a strong
argument with respect to “legitimate regulatory distinction.” For the rea-
sons discussed in Part II above, conveying the message to consumers that
foodstuffs have been air-freighted or have travelled a certain distance will
have a tenuous effect, at best, on reducing GHG emissions. In
U.S.–COOL, the Appellate Body found a “disconnect” between the re-
quirements placed on meat producers and processors and the information
received by consumers. The purported objective of the measure was to
inform consumers about the country of origin of various meats, yet the
required format for some of the labels was to provide information that did
not actually make clear the meat’s country of origin. As such, the Appel-
late Body found a “disconnect” between the information required to be
collected and the information provided to consumers on the labels. Ac-
166. TBT Agreement, supra note 89, pmbl.
167. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31(1), 31(2), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
168. U.S.–Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 113, ¶ 89; U.S.–Tuna II
(Mexico) Appellate Body Report, supra note 114, ¶¶ 212–13; US – COOL Appellate Body
Report, supra note 115, ¶ 268.
169. U.S.–COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 115, ¶ 271.
170. See AGRICULTURE AND AGRI-FOOD CANADA, supra note 159.
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cordingly, the measure was arbitrary and the disparate impact on imports
was not justifiable.171
In the case of a food miles labeling requirement, it would be simpler
to calculate the distance the food travelled than for the meat producers
and processors to comply with the informational requirements at issue in
U.S.–COOL. Nonetheless, the measure is, in theory, intended to provide
information about carbon (un)friendliness, whereas the actual information
provided—the distance food has travelled or the fact it has been air-
freighted—has little bearing on the carbon friendliness or unfriendliness
of the food. As such, U.S.–COOL may suggest that a panel would find a
food miles labeling requirement to be arbitrary and unjustified—that the
regulatory distinction being drawn between air-freighted and non-air-
freighted produce, for example, is not a legitimate one.
Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement set forth separate require-
ments, such that a finding the Article 2.1 has been violated will not neces-
sarily result in a finding that Article 2.2 has also been violated.172
Article 2.2 provides:
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared,
adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose,
technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than nec-
essary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks
non-fulfilment would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter
alia: national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive
practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant
life or health, or the environment. In assessing such risks, relevant
elements of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and
technical information, related processing technology or intended
end-uses of products.173
In the U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) case, the Appellate Body explained that
a “legitimate objective” will be one that is “an aim or target that is lawful,
justifiable, or proper.”174 Because Article 2.2 uses the term “inter alia”
171. U.S.–COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 115, ¶¶ 347–349.
172. Panel Report, United States–Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove
Cigarettes, ¶ 7.332, WT/DS406/R (Sept. 2, 2011). To date, the Appellate Body has never
found a violation of Article 2.2. The U.S.–Clove Cigarettes panel found a violation of Article
2.1, but not of Article 2.2. Id. ¶ 8.1 (c). Similarly, the Appellate Body in U.S.–Tuna II (Mex-
ico) found a violation of TBT Article 2.1, but no violation of Article 2.2. U.S.–Tuna II (Mex-
ico) Appellate Body Report, supra note 114, ¶ 407. In U.S.–COOL, the Appellate Body
reversed the Panel’s finding that the U.S. measure was inconsistent with Article 2.2 because
the Panel had “ignored its own findings” that the U.S. labels did contribute towards the
measure’s objective.  The Appellate Body was unable to complete the legal analysis to reach
its own conclusion due to insufficient factual evidence on the record regarding the degree the
labeling measure contributed to the objective and with respect to less trade restrictive alter-
natives. U.S.–COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 115, ¶¶ 468, 476–491.
173. TBT Agreement, supra note 89, art. 2.2.
174. U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, supra note 114, ¶ 313.
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when listing legitimate objectives, this should be understood to be an in-
dicative, rather than a closed, list.175 In addition, the Appellate Body has
noted that the sixth and seventh recitals of the TBT Agreement preamble
identify objectives that overlap significantly with those set forth in Article
2.2.176 A food miles labeling requirement would seemingly fall within the
iterated example of protecting the environment, as well as the similar lan-
guage found in the sixth recital of the preamble. However, to determine
legitimacy, a panel must try to determine what the actual aim of the regu-
lation is, by examining the “structure and operation” of the measure.177
Thus, the particulars of a specific regulation would need to be considered
before concluding definitively that its objective is “legitimate.”
In U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico), Mexico appealed the panel’s determination
that the United States’ objective of “contributing to the protection of dol-
phins, by ensuring the U.S. market is not used to encourage fishing fleets
to catch tuna in a manner that adversely affects dolphins” was “legiti-
mate.”178 Mexico argued that dolphin protection is a legitimate objective
but the United States had chosen to further that objective through illegiti-
mate means.179 The Appellate Body noted that Article 2.2 prohibits “un-
necessary obstacles” to international trade, and as such the Article
contemplates that some obstacles to trade will be acceptable. Therefore,
the fact that a measure burdens international trade will not, by itself, be
sufficient to find that an objective is not “legitimate”.180
Does the Measure Fulfill the Objective?
The Appellate Body also explained that fulfilling a legitimate objec-
tive does not require complete achievement of the objective but could be a
greater or lesser contribution towards the goal. The question then is “the
degree of contribution that the technical regulation makes toward the
achievement of the legitimate objective.”181
Thus, for this portion of the analysis, a panel would have to examine
whether food miles labeling contributed—at all—towards the objective of
shrinking a country’s carbon footprint. As indicated above, there is some
data to suggest that customers do not make purchasing decisions based on
175. Id. ¶ 313.
176. Id. The Appellate Body noted, as it did with respect to Article 2.1, that the sixth
recital of the preamble is relevant context when interpreting Article 2.2. See id. ¶ 316. For a
discussion of the Appellate Body’s findings related to Article 2.1, see discussion supra Part
IV(B)(1)(c)(i).
177. U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, supra note 114, ¶ 314.
178. Id. ¶¶ 335–337.
179. Id. ¶ 337.
180. Id. ¶ 338.
181. Id. ¶ 315. Also of note is U.S.–COOL, where the Appellate Body criticized the
panel for trying to determine whether the measure fulfilled the objective completely, or to a
threshold level. For this portion of the analysis, the panel should instead establish the extent
to which the measure fulfils the objective. U.S.–COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note
115, ¶ 468.
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food miles labels. However, in surveys, customers profess that such infor-
mation does influence their buying habits.182 Even if it were determined
that customers were buying fewer air-freighted or distance-shipped prod-
ucts as a result of labeling, it is also a question whether such changes in
purchasing have any bearing on a country’s overall carbon footprint. As
discussed in Part II, there is little if any correlation between food miles
and levels of carbon emissions for a product as a whole, due to other con-
tributors to an overall carbon footprint. It is therefore possible that a
panel would find that food miles labeling does not contribute—even mini-
mally—to fulfilling any sort of climate-friendly objective. However, it is
also possible that, for a given country’s labeling scheme and affected prod-
ucts, a panel could find that, on the evidence, the particular food miles
label correlated in some measure with fewer purchases of products that
indeed had a significant carbon footprint. In such a case, the panel would
then need to continue its analysis to determine whether the measure is
“not more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil” the legitimate objec-
tive, “taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create.”
If a measure is not trade restrictive, it cannot violate Article 2.2.183
However, the mere fact that a measure is trade restrictive does not per se
indicate a violation. The question is whether the degree of restrictiveness
is necessary, taking into consideration the consequences of non-fulfillment
of the objective.
The Appellate Body explained in U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) that in as-
sessing whether a measure is more trade restrictive than necessary, a panel
should consider: “(i) the degree of contribution made by the measure to
the legitimate objective at issue; (ii) the trade-restrictiveness of the mea-
sure; and (iii) the risks at issue and the gravity of the consequences that
would arise from non-fulfilment of the objective(s) pursued by the Mem-
ber through the measure.”184 The Appellate Body also indicated that this
analysis will usually entail a comparison of the measure at issue with possi-
ble alternatives to the measure.185
Any labeling requirement would need to be evaluated in connection
with its specific criteria and the products to which the label would apply.
However, it seems likely that a Panel would find a food miles labeling
requirement to contribute only minimally, if at all, towards a legitimate
objective (in this case environmental protection). In this regard, the Ap-
pellate Body has indicated the panel must determine the contribution the
measure has actually made, in practice, rather than what the member’s
aspirations or predictions are.186
It is not especially burdensome or expensive to affix an airplane
sticker or “distance travelled” label onto foodstuffs or food packaging. In
182. AGRICULTURE AND AGRI-FOOD CANADA, supra note 159.
183. VAN DEN BOSSCHE & ZDOUC, supra note 127, at 874.
184. U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, supra note 114, ¶ 322.
185. Id.
186. Id. ¶ 317.
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addition, it may be the case that such labels do not influence consumer
decision-making and as such are not particularly trade restrictive. None-
theless, such a labeling requirement would not be burden-free. Consumers
have expressed a preference for locally sourced produce and are increas-
ingly concerned with the environmental impact of their purchases. A given
member may be able to demonstrate that its exporters have lost sales as a
result of a labeling measure. In addition, there are some costs, even if
small, involved in preparing and affixing labels. Furthermore, requiring
one product to bear an airplane sticker while the identical domestic prod-
uct need not, arguably “modifies the conditions of competition in the rele-
vant market to the detriment of imported products.”187
A food miles labeling scheme would, as noted above, likely only con-
tribute minimally towards an environmental protection objective. As such,
the consequences of not meeting that minimal level of contribution could
be viewed as rather minor.
It would be for the complaining member to show that an alternative
measure or measures would be less trade restrictive while still fulfilling the
objective of the member imposing the measure. In this regard, a member
could propose a voluntary labeling scheme as an alternative (as in
U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico)). While producers would be unlikely to elect to
affix an airplane sticker on their produce, producers might choose to in-
form consumers of positive environmental attributes associated with the
transport or production of their foodstuffs. A voluntary scheme that gave
producers such an opportunity would arguably give consumers more rele-
vant information with respect to the environmental implications of
purchasing various foods and would not inherently disadvantage imported
products relative to domestic ones.
It is arguable though that a voluntary scheme along the lines just de-
scribed would not achieve the same objective sought by the member. The
member may particularly wish to use negative rather than positive messag-
ing to discourage certain purchases rather than to encourage other ones.
In U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico), the Appellate Body scrutinized Mexico’s alter-
native measure closely and reversed the panel’s conclusion that the pro-
posed alternative measure would achieve the U.S.’s objectives to the same
degree as the measure at issue.188 Given the potential difficulty in identify-
ing a suitable alternative measure, it is possible that a complaining mem-
ber would have difficulty demonstrating a violation of Article 2.2.189
Indeed, the Appellate Body has yet to find a violation of this TBT Agree-
ment provision. However, if the panel were to find that the food miles
labeling scheme makes no contribution towards fulfilling the member’s ob-
187. Appellate Body Report, Korea–Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Beef, ¶ 137, WT/DS161/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) (emphasis in the original) [hereinafter
Korea–Beef Appellate Body Report]; Appellate Body Report, Thailand–Customs and Fiscal
Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, ¶ 128, WT/DS371/AB/R (June 17, 2011) [herein-
after Thailand–Cigarettes (Philippines) Appellate Body Report].
188. U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, supra note 114, ¶ 330.
189. See Voon, Mitchell & Gascoigne, supra note 125, at 13.
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jective, it likely would not require the complaining member to propose an
alternative measure.190
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement provides that “[w]here technical
regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or their
completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of
them, as a basis for their technical regulations except when such interna-
tional standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate
means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued.”191
The Appellate Body has indicated that “international standards” are
standards promulgated by international standardizing bodies, where such
bodies are open to the participation of at least all WTO members.192 The
International Standards Organization (ISO) has partnered with the WTO
with respect to standards issues and is understood to be a promulgator of
international standards.193 The ISO has created a set of standards, known
as the 14020 series, to address different types of environmental labeling.
There are three types of environmental labeling—deemed Types I, II and
III—within the 14020 series.194
The standard most likely to be found applicable to food miles labeling
requirements is Type II environmental labeling, which falls under ISO
14021.195 ISO 14021 covers the situation where manufacturers, retailers
and others use labels on their products that connect the product with a
favorable environmental impact, e.g. by labeling the product “sustainable”
or “carbon neutral.” Although ISO 14021 generally addresses positive en-
vironmental claims, the ISO has discussed carbon footprint or food miles
statements in the context of ISO 14021.196 ISO 14021 provides that climate
change effects should be considered across the lifecycle of a product. Ac-
cordingly, the ISO has stated that “low CO2-emissions during the trans-
190. In U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico), the Appellate Body indicated that under such circum-
stances a comparison with an alternative measure may not be required. See U.S.–Tuna II
(Mexico) Appellate Body Report, supra note 114, ¶ 322 & n. 647.
191. TBT Agreement, supra note 89, art. 2.4.
192. See U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, supra note 114, ¶¶ 349–64. See
also TBT Agreement, supra note 89, Annex 1.4.
193. See, e.g., TBT Agreement, supra note 89, Annex 1 (adopting ISO definitions); id.
Annex 3 (providing for standardizing bodies to notify to the ISO their acceptance or with-
drawal from the code of good practice for the preparation, adoption and application of stan-
dards); Technical Information on Technical Barriers to Trade, WTO, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_info_e.htm (last visited May 15, 2014) (noting that “ISO has devel-
oped more than 9,600 international standards covering almost all technical fields.”).
194. See Richard Bonsi, A.L. Hammett & Bob Smith, Eco-labels and International
Trade: Problems and Solutions, 42 J. WORLD TRADE 407, 410–11 (2008).
195. Type I labels, covered by ISO 14024, require life cycle analyses. See discussion infra
Part IV. Type III labels addressed by ISO 14025, cover environmental declarations that are
based on independently verified data. These labels list multiple potential impacts of the prod-
uct during its life cycle. As such it has been suggested that, while such labels could be rele-
vant for business-to-consumer interactions, they are likely most useful for business-to-
business relationships. See id., at 411.
196. See ISO, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELS AND DECLARATIONS: HOW ISO STANDARDS
HELP 13 (2012), available at http://www.iso.org/iso/environmental-labelling.pdf.
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port phase” should not be “used to mask a higher overall burden due to
high production emissions.”197
In the EC–Sardines case, the Appellate Body interpreted the require-
ment in TBT Article 2.4 that members use international standards “as a
basis for their technical regulations,” indicating that an international stan-
dard serves ‘“as a basis for” a technical regulation when it is used as the
principal constituent or fundamental principle for the purpose of enacting
the technical regulation.”198 In that dispute, the Appellate Body stated
that, whatever “as a basis for” means, “if the technical regulation and the
international standard contradict each other, it cannot properly be con-
cluded that the international standard has been used “as a basis for” the
technical regulation.”199
It is difficult to determine in the abstract whether a given food miles
measure would fit within ISO 14021, but it seems possible that a measure
requiring only food miles information, or the affixing of an airplane
sticker, may be inconsistent with ISO 14021 and as such render the mea-
sure vulnerable under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
In summary, a food miles labeling scheme would implicate a number
of TBT Agreement provisions. Of these, the TBT jurisprudence suggests
that a breach of Article 2.1 would likely be the easiest to demonstrate.
2. GATT Article III:4
While the TBT Agreement provides specialized rules covering prod-
uct labeling schemes and other technical regulations or standards, it does
not displace GATT provisions, which may also be relevant. The Appellate
Body has held that members’ obligations under these two agreements are
cumulative, and if a measure falls within the scope of both the TBT Agree-
ment and the GATT, then the provisions of both agreements must be
complied with.200
The national treatment requirement set out in Article III:4 of the
GATT requires that WTO members accord imported like products treat-
ment, which is “no less favourable” than products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
For any measure to fall within the scope of this provision, it must be a
“law, regulation or requirement.” Exactly what measures will fall within
the scope of the “requirements” subject to Article III:4 is unclear. Many of
the cases discussed above in Part I.C.2 of this article related to claims
under Article III:4 of the GATT, and considered which measures may
constitute “requirements.”201 A measure will not be a “requirement” if it
197. Id.
198. EC–Sardines Appellate Body Report, supra note 111, ¶¶ 243–44.
199. Id.  ¶ 248.
200. EC–Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 110, ¶ 80.
201. E.g., Canada–Autos Panel Report, supra note 96, ¶¶ 10.106–10.107.
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is a private action that cannot be attributed to the government.202 Further,
voluntary schemes are less likely to constitute “requirements” than
mandatory ones.
Since the GATT era, the concept of laws and regulations that affect
the “internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution
or use of goods” has been interpreted broadly to include not only mea-
sures that directly regulate the sale of products, but all measures that
“might adversely modify the conditions of competition between domestic
and imported products.”203 A labeling scheme is likely to meet this thresh-
old if it will make imported products less commercially attractive.204 Thus,
a food miles labeling requirement will violate Article III:4 if it accords
imported like products treatment less favorable than that accorded to do-
mestic products.
a. Like Products
The analysis of whether the products are like for the purposes of
GATT Article III:4 would be very similar to that undertaken in relation to
TBT Article 2.1. As discussed above,205 the fundamental question being
determined is “the nature and extent of a competitive relationship be-
tween and among the products at issue.”206 Food miles schemes distin-
guish between products solely on the basis of the distance the products
have travelled. This factor is not directly relevant to the characteristics
used by panels and the Appellate Body to determine the competitive rela-
tionship, namely the products’ physical properties, end-uses, consumer-
preferences, and tariff classification.207 Note that, though it has been sug-
gested that food miles may influence consumer preferences, actual buying
habits of consumers have not yet borne this contention out.208 Thus, the
products are likely to be considered, prima facie, to be like under Article
III:4. Further, given that it is unlikely that food miles can be considered a
PPM, it is highly unlikely that a panel or Appellate Body would find that
food miles render products unlike on the basis of a npr-PPM argument.
b. Treatment No Less Favourable
When considering if a member has accorded imports treatment, which
is ‘no less favourable’ than the treatment local products receive, the Ap-
202. Id.
203. Canada–Autos Panel Report, supra note 96, ¶ 10.80 (citing Report of the Panel,
Italy–Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, ¶ 12, L/833 (Jul. 15, 1958)
GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 60).
204. See Lennert Steijger, Note, Genetically Modified Food for Thought: EU Labeling
Legislation Examined Under the GATT 1994, 12 TILBURG FOREIGN L. REV. 297, 305
(2004–2005).
205. See infra Part IV(B).
206. See EC–Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 110, ¶ 99.
207. Id. ¶ 101; Japan–Alcoholic Beverages II Appellate Body Report, supra note 153, at
21.
208. See AGRICULTURE AND AGRI-FOOD CANADA, supra note 159.
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pellate Body has held that it is necessary to compare the treatment of
imports as a group with domestic products as a group.209 In the Ko-
rea–Beef case, the Appellate Body indicated that the issue was whether
the measure had modified the conditions of competition to the detriment
of imported products.210
Food miles and other eco-labeling schemes do not prevent imported
goods from being sold in a market, and they do not necessarily impose an
additional cost on imported products as compared to local products (as-
suming the labeling requirement applies to goods irrespective of ori-
gin).211 It may therefore appear that food miles labeling schemes that
apply to all products do not treat imports less favourably than local goods.
However, simply because a labeling scheme applies to all like products
does not mean that it accords them equal treatment. What must be consid-
ered is the impact of the labeling scheme on the competitive opportunities
of the products, and how the measure impacts the market for the like
products.212 This is a fact-specific exercise, which will depend on the char-
acteristics of the market and products at issue.
The Appellate Body has recently held that access to a “dolphin-safe”
label for tuna products may constitute a competitive advantage for those
products, and that this advantage is provided by the measures them-
selves.213 A dolphin-safe tuna labeling scheme is different from a food
miles labeling scheme, as the “advantage” in the former is access to the
“dolphin-safe” label,214 while the latter requires all products to be labeled
(and the distinction between products is in the food miles tally reported on
the label). Yet an analogous argument could be made that requiring food
miles tallies to be included on labels advantages products with low tallies,
as environmentally conscious consumers may be more likely to buy those
products. While this advantage stems from consumer decisions, rather
than being a direct consequence of the measure itself, the content of the
label is controlled by the requirements of the food miles program.215
Therefore, any competitive advantage accorded to products by a food
miles labeling scheme may constitute less favourable treatment for other
like products that have travelled a longer distance to reach the market.
Further, depending on the precise requirements of the scheme, the mere
obligation to affix an additional label on a product, for example an air-
plane sticker, may itself be a disadvantage in comparison to products that
do not have to go to the additional expense of affixing a label or sticker.
That is, requiring additional stickers or labels to be added to products
209. EC–Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 110, ¶ 100.
210. See Korea–Beef Appellate Body Report, supra note 187, ¶¶ 143–151.
211. Waye, supra note 126, at 293. Of course if local products were deemed to have
“zero” food miles or were exempt from the labeling requirement then this would most likely
constitute favorable treatment.
212. U.S.–COOL Panel Report, supra note 130, ¶¶ 7.298–7.302.
213. U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, supra note 114, ¶¶ 233–240.
214. Id. ¶ 238.
215. Id.
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takes time, printing costs and have the potential to occupy valuable label
space that could otherwise be utilized by manufacturers.
The success of a challenge to food miles on the basis of Article III:4
will therefore depend on whether there is sufficient evidence to demon-
strate that food miles will affect consumer decisions, defined broadly. In
the recent U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) case, the Appellate Body held that there
was strong evidence U.S. consumers prefer dolphin-safe tuna.216 As noted
above, there is limited evidence that consumers prefer foods that have a
low food miles tally.217 However, this evidence does not have to relate to
the preferences of end consumers of products, it may also relate to the
choices of suppliers and processors. In the U.S.–COOL case, the Appel-
late Body held that imported livestock was disadvantaged by the measure
as several plants and companies had refused to process imported livestock
as a result of the measure.218 If wholesalers or retailers were less inclined
to market or distribute goods with high food miles, this could provide evi-
dence that food miles labeling causes less favourable treatment to other-
wise like products.
If it is accepted that a labeling scheme may accord an advantage to
products with a low food miles tally (and therefore less favourable treat-
ment to products with a higher tally), to prove a violation of the national
treatment obligation it must then be shown that this discriminates between
domestically produced goods and imported goods. As food miles are
based only on the distance a product travels to market, it is likely that a
complaining WTO member could establish that such a labeling scheme
treated imports less favorably than domestically produced goods.219 It is
assumed that, in most cases, domestically produced goods will have a sig-
nificantly lower miles tally than imported goods.220
3. GATT Article I:1
Article I:1 of the GATT is a Most-Favored Nation (MFN) clause,
which stipulates that:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed
on or in connection with importation or exportation . . . and with
respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article
III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any
Member to any product originating in or destined for any other
216. U.S.–Tuna II (Mexico) Panel Report, supra note 135, ¶¶ 7.288–7.289.
217. See also ABARE Report, supra note 8, at 19 (referring to a study that ranked the
importance to consumers of sixteen food attributes, with food miles and carbon labeling
ranking as fourteenth and sixteenth, respectively); cf. id. at 12 (referring to studies which
demonstrate that other eco-labeling schemes have influenced consumer demand).
218. See U.S.–COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 115, n.981.
219. Waye, supra note 126 at 293–94.
220. In comparing the carbon intensity of U.K. and New Zealand products, it has been
assumed that no shipping occurs to bring U.K. products into the market, in comparison to the
significant distance travelled by N.Z. imports. See ABARE Report, supra note 8, at 17.
Spring 2014] Food Miles 621
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the
like product originating in or destined for the territories of all
other Members.
The MFN obligation contained in Article I:1 therefore applies to any
custom duties or charges, such as tariffs, and to all “laws, regulations and
requirements affecting [the goods] internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use” (the matters referred to in
Article III:4 of GATT). The coverage of this article is thus very broad and
could encompass eco-labeling schemes, differential tariffs, carbon taxes
and a variety of other food miles measures.221
With respect to these measures, WTO members are obliged to:
a) extend any advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity that it has
granted to goods originating in another country;
b) immediately and unconditionally;
c) to like products;
d) originating in other WTO members.
e) The meaning of each of these terms is considered below.
a. What Is an “Advantage, Favor, Privilege or Immunity”?
For certain pecuniary measures, such as differential tariff rates, the
identification of an advantage that is accorded to some products is clear.
Non-fiscal regulatory measures may also constitute an advantage. For ex-
ample, in EC–Bananas III the panel held that allowing some importers to
go through a less complicated licensing procedure could constitute an “ad-
vantage” under Article I:1. An omission, such as an exemption from cus-
toms fees, may also constitute an advantage.222 The obligation contained
in Article I:1 applies regardless of the size of the advantage or privilege at
issue, as even a small advantage may cause a breach223 and applies to both
de facto and de jure discrimination.224
It is clear that a differential tariff or a carbon tax that was linked to
food miles would constitute an “advantage” being granted to certain prod-
ucts (those that benefit from the lower tax rate). Whether or not a food
miles labeling scheme constitutes an “advantage, favour, privilege or im-
munity” is less straightforward. It is commonly argued that eco-labeling
schemes may constitute an advantage if their requirements do not apply to
all like products (for example, the E.U. requirement that GM foods must
221. On the breadth of the MFN obligation, see PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, GEORGE A.
BERMANN & MARK WU, THE LAW OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO): DOCU-
MENTS, CASES AND ANALYSIS 140 (2010).
222. MAVROIDIS, BERMANN & WU, supra note 221, at 143 (discussing Report of the
Panel, United States–Customs User Fee, L/6264 (Nov. 25, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp)
at 245).
223. Appellate Body Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive In-
dustry, ¶ 79, WT/DS139/AB/R (May 31, 2000) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Canada–Autos
Appellate Body Report].
224. Id. ¶ 78.
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be labeled, while non-GM foods do not require such labels).225 Thus, a
carbon labeling scheme that required goods that had been transported by
air to be marked as such, but did not require like products that were trans-
ported by sea to be labeled, may be considered to grant an advantage or
favor to those products shipped by sea, as they are not subject to the costs
and competitiveness impacts of the labeling requirement.226 In this in-
stance, the advantage accorded to foods transported by sea or road is that
they are omitted from the labeling requirement.
On its face, a scheme mandating that all labels state the distance that
the product has travelled from its point of origin does not constitute an
“advantage” for any food products because all foods are subject to the
labeling requirement. Yet a lower food mile tally may give products a com-
petitive edge in the market when all foods must be labeled with their food
miles.227 This may arguably constitute an “advantage” for goods imported
from nearby countries when compared to those imported from more dis-
tant WTO members (even though all of these goods would be subject to
the labeling requirement). If this latter argument were accepted, then food
miles labeling schemes could constitute an “advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity” even if they apply to all food products.
b. Like Products
Whether or not the products that are subject to a food miles labeling
scheme are “like” will depend upon an analysis of the four criteria detailed
above in relation to the TBT Agreement and GATT Article III:4: namely,
the products’ physical properties; the products’ end-uses; consumer-pref-
erences; and tariff classification. While these criteria were developed in
cases in relating to Article III of the GATT, they have also been applied in
cases analyzing Article I.228 Although similar criteria apply under each of
these articles, it has been suggested that the scope of “like products”
under Article I should be narrower than that under Article III:4 and that
greater emphasis should be given to the tariff classification of the
products.229
Even if a narrow approach is taken to the analysis of whether products
are “like” for the purposes of Article I, it is likely that food products that
are differentiated only by the miles they have travelled from their point of
origin would be considered “like.” For the reasons discussed above in sec-
tion I.D(a), it is unlikely that a panel or the Appellate Body would hold
that products are “unlike” on the basis of the distance they have travelled
when imported.
225. Steijger, supra note 204, at 309.
226. This sort of labeling requirement has already been employed by companies in the
UK including Marks & Spencer and Tesco. See Saunders, supra note 106, at 86.
227. See supra Part II(D).
228. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States–Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poul-
try from China, ¶ 7.425, WT/DS392/R (Sept. 29, 2010); Panel Report, Indonesia–Certain
Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, ¶ 14.141, WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998).
229. MAVROIDIS, BERMANN & WU, supra note 221, at 146.
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c. Accorded Immediately and Unconditionally to the
Products of Other Members
Article I of the GATT requires that any advantage bestowed on prod-
ucts imported from one country be accorded immediately and uncondi-
tionally to like products imported from any WTO member. The
requirement that the advantage be accorded to WTO members “immedi-
ately” is relatively unproblematic and is generally considered in tandem
with the requirement that it be accorded unconditionally.230 However, in-
terpreting the term “unconditionally” is less clear-cut. Essentially, the re-
quirement seems to be that no additional conditions may be imposed
when an advantage is accorded to a WTO member in accordance with the
MFN obligation, but any conditions that were already part of the initial
granting of the advantage to the relevant imports country may be im-
posed.231 For example, if a tariff reduction on goods from Country A were
conditional upon those goods being certified as environmentally sustaina-
ble, it would not violate the requirement for an advantage to be accorded
“unconditionally” if that same certification was required for the tariff re-
duction to be granted to goods from Country B.
There is some debate as to whether Article I:1 requires a comparison
between groups of imports (i.e. do imports from Country A as a whole
receive the advantages accorded to imports from Country B), or between
individual imported products (i.e. is the advantage that is extended to
some imports from Country A extended to all like products imported from
Country B).232 In relation to food miles, the distinction between these two
approaches is not likely to be of great significance. As food miles are
based on the distance from the country of origin to the importing country,
it is likely that all imports from any given country will receive relatively
similar treatment. For instance, a study commissioned by the U.K. Gov-
ernment, which evaluated the concept of food miles, calculated the miles
for each product on the basis of the distance from the capital city of the
country of origin, without any reference to where within that country the
foodstuffs were actually produced.233
4. Potential Defenses to GATT Violations – Article XX
If a food miles scheme were held to violate either GATT Article I or
Article III, then the defending WTO member may claim that the measure
is justified by one of the environmental exceptions in Article XX. These
exceptions are Article XX paragraphs (b) and (g), which protect measures
230. Canada–Autos Appellate Body Report, supra note 223, ¶ 85.
231. Canada–Autos Panel Report, supra note 96, ¶ 10.24; MAVROIDIS, BERMANN &
WU, supra note 221, at 146.
232. See, e.g., Lothar Ehring, De Facto Discrimination in World Trade Law: National
and Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment—or Equal Treatment?, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 921
(2002); Nicolas F. Diebold, Standards of Non-discrimination in International Economic Law,
60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 831 (2011).
233. DEFRA REPORT, supra note 30, at Annex 1, A1–11.
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“necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” and those
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources”
respectively.
a. Article XX(g): Relating to the Conservation of
Exhaustible Natural Resources
One of the major motivations for buying products with low food miles
is reducing the environmental impact of greenhouse gas emissions from
shipping food.234 While neither the Appellate Body nor any panel has yet
had to decide this point, the temperate climate or “cool air” could be con-
sidered to be “exhaustible natural resources” protected by Article
XX(g).235 The Appellate Body has held that clean air emissions standards
may fall within the scope of Article XX(g), which supports the view that a
livable climate could also fall within the scope of this provision.236
The standard for determining whether a measure “relates to” an ex-
haustible natural resource is relatively undemanding. This test can be satis-
fied by demonstrating that a “real” connection exists between a measure
and its objective.237 Transport of food products by air, road or ship pro-
duces greenhouse gas emissions, and therefore it could be said that label-
ing relating to the carbon footprint of this transport also “relates to” the
objective of conserving a livable or temperate climate.238 However, food
miles do not necessarily equate to greenhouse gas emissions, as they only
take account of the distance that food has travelled rather than the mode
of transportation and other factors which may affect emissions. It is there-
fore arguable whether food miles schemes “relate to” the objective of con-
serving a temperate climate.
In order for a measure to be protected by Article XX(g) it must also
be implemented “in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production
or consumption.” If a food miles labeling scheme applied to both domestic
and imported goods, then this requirement would most likely to be
satisfied.
234. ABARE Report, supra note 8, at 13.
235. Robert Howse & Antonia L. Eliason, Domestic and International Strategies to Ad-
dress Climate Change: an Overview of the WTO Legal Issues, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE
REGULATION AND THE MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE: WORLD TRADE FORUM, supra
note 126, at 48, 71–73; Andrew Green, Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO, 8 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 143, 183 (2005).
236. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Standards for Reformulated and Con-
ventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter U.S.–Gasoline Appellate
Body Report].
237. Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, ¶ 141, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
238. Waye, supra note 126, at 295.
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b. Article XX(b): Necessary to Protect Human, Animal or
Plant Life or Health
Given the potentially grave impacts of climate change on the environ-
ment and the threat to human life and health, it is arguable that measures
based on food miles may also fall within the scope of Article XX(b).239
This provision is subject to a strict necessity test, and not all measures that
may help mitigate climate change will fall within its scope.
Whether a measure is “necessary” within the meaning of Article
XX(b) is determined through a “weighing and balancing” of factors,240
including: the “‘relative importance’ of the interests or values furthered by
the challenged measure”;241 the “contribution of the measure to the reali-
zation of the ends pursued by it”;242 and the extent to which the measure
is restrictive of trade.243 Further, what must be shown to be necessary is
not the measure in its entirety, but rather “the treatment giving rise to the
finding of less favourable treatment.”244 In relation to a food miles label-
ing scheme, it is the labels themselves (which embody the calculation of
the food miles), which are the cause of the less favorable treatment.
Considering how these tests apply to food miles, it is likely that cli-
mate change mitigation would be considered to be an interest of high im-
portance. However, a defending member may struggle to demonstrate that
its food miles measure contributes to climate change mitigation. Given the
size of the climate change issue, no single measure by a WTO member is
likely to make a major contribution to solving the problem, and the exact
benefits of a measure may be uncertain at the time at which the measure is
introduced. While not directly relevant to the measure at issue, in Bra-
zil–Retreaded Tyres the Appellate Body cited global warming as an exam-
ple of a situation where the effects of a measure “can only be evaluated
with the benefit of time.”245 In addition, the Brazil–Retreaded Tyres re-
port noted that Article XX(b) may apply even if the individual measure
alone could not redress the risk to human, plant or animal health, and was
part of a “comprehensive policy comprising a multiplicity of interacting
measures.”246 However, the Appellate Body then went on to note that
where a measure is particularly trade restrictive (such as an import ban),
“it would be difficult for a panel to find that measure necessary unless it is
satisfied that the measure is apt to make a material contribution to the
achievement of its objective,” rather than merely a “marginal or insignifi-
239. Id. at 294.
240. Korea–Beef Appellate Body Report, supra note 187, ¶ 164.
241. U.S.–Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 86, ¶ 306 (footnote omitted).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Thailand–Cigarettes (Philippines) Appellate Body Report, supra note 187, ¶ 177.
245. Appellate Body Report, Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶
151, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007).
246. Id.
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cant contribution.”247 Therefore while it may not be necessary to show
that a measure alone can achieve its objective, it must be shown that it
makes more than a “marginal or insignificant” contribution—or in the
case of more restrictive measures such as import bans a material contribu-
tion—to its stated end.
In order to establish that food miles contribute to climate protection, a
member would need to demonstrate that there was a reduction in green-
house gas emissions. This would assume that either a food miles labeling
scheme, or a tax linked to food miles, affected the market and reduced the
distance that food was being transported. Even if this could be demon-
strated, it would then need to be shown that this led to a quantitative re-
duction in greenhouse gas emissions associated with the production and
transportation of the relevant food products. Given that a food miles
scheme is unlikely to be considered particularly trade restrictive—it would
not, for example, be similar to an import ban in severity—its contribution
to reducing greenhouse gas emissions would only need to be more than
marginal or insignificant. Studies on the efficacy of food miles as an envi-
ronmental tool have found, however, that often locally produced goods
use more energy in production and storage than imported goods, out-
weighing the elimination of emissions from transport.248 If a food miles
scheme were to lead to consumers purchasing more locally produced
foods, but those foods had a higher greenhouse gas intensity than food
that travelled further from its point of origin, then this scheme would not
be apt to contribute to climate change mitigation and likely would fall
outside the scope of the Article XX(b) exception.
The final factor to be considered to determine if a food miles scheme
is “necessary” is the trade restrictiveness of the measure. Environmental
labeling schemes are less trade restrictive than many other measures, and
voluntary schemes even less so than mandatory ones.249 Thus, a food miles
labeling scheme is not likely to be considered particularly trade restrictive,
which weighs in favor of it being considered “necessary.”
If a measure is considered to be “necessary” following this weighing
and balancing of factors, then the next step of analysis under Article
XX(b) is to assess whether there are less trade restrictive alternatives that
are reasonably available. One such alternative may be carbon footprint
labels, which take account of the greenhouse gas emissions caused during
the life-cycle of a product, rather than just the transport from its country
of origin. These labels would be less trade restrictive, as they provide a
more balanced analysis of the sustainability of food products and are less
likely to disadvantage imports (vis-a`-vis domestic products). However, life
cycle analysis is very costly to undertake, which may mean that it is not
“reasonably available” as an alternative to food miles.250
247. Id.
248. See, e.g., ABARE Report, supra note 8, at 15–17; DEFRA REPORT, supra note 30.
See also discussion supra Part III(A)(4).
249. Joshi, supra note 126, at 90.
250. Life cycle analysis is discussed in more detail infra Part IV(A).
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c. The Chapeau of Article XX
In order for a food miles scheme to be justified under either Article
XX(b) or (g) of GATT, it must also comply with the Article’s chapeau.
The chapeau requires that measures are not “applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination be-
tween countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restric-
tion on international trade.” Analysis under the chapeau of Article XX
focuses on whether the application of the measure is discriminatory, as
opposed to whether the measure itself is discriminatory.251
Food miles measures may constitute a means of arbitrary or justifiable
discrimination, depending on how they are implemented. If a food miles
measure solely requires a calculation of distance travelled, without refer-
ence to the mode of transport used, then this may constitute unjustifiable
discrimination as the emissions caused by sea transportation are consider-
ably lower than those from road or air shipment.252 Likewise, a food miles
scheme may constitute unjustifiable discrimination where it disadvantages
products that have a lower overall carbon footprint than domestically pro-
duced foods.
5. Subsidies and the SCM Agreement
Following the recent global financial crisis, several commentators have
raised the possibility that “buy local” schemes could constitute subsidies
within the scope of the SCM Agreement.253 Food miles measures, which
encourage the purchase of locally produced goods, may also potentially be
considered to be a form of subsidy.
In order for a measure to constitute a “subsidy,” as defined in Article
1 of the SCM Agreement, it must involve a “financial contribution” from
the government of a WTO member, which confers a “benefit” on the re-
cipient. The term “financial contribution” includes many measures in addi-
tion to direct payments by governments, for instance, tax credits and
funding mechanisms.254 Unless a food miles scheme were accompanied by
a tax incentive for locally produced goods or similar monetary benefits
provided by the government, it is unlikely that it would fall within the
scope of subsidies that are regulated by the SCM Agreement. Many of the
“buy local” schemes that may raise issues under the SCM Agreement are
linked to funding provided by the government, such as stimulus funding
251. U.S.–Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 236, at 22.
252. For details of the impact of various kinds of freight methods, see DEFRA REPORT,
supra note 30.
253. See generally RAYMOND J. AHEARN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40461, THE
GLOBAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN AND PROTECTIONISM  (2009); Gary N. Horlick & Peggy A.
Clarke, WTO Subsidies Discipline During and After the Crisis, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 859, 865
(2010); Brendan Ruddy, Note, The Critical Success of the WTO: Trade Policies of the Current
Economic Crisis, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 475 (2010).
254. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. 1.1(a)(1), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 at
Art. 1.1(a)(1) [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
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provided by the U.S. Government under the Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009.255
In addition to meeting these two requirements, a subsidy must also be
“specific.”256 Prohibited subsidies—those linked to export performance or
domestic content requirements—are deemed to be specific. For other sub-
sidies to be “actionable” under the SCM Agreement, they must only be
provided to a particular enterprise or industry.257 A food miles scheme
that was limited to a certain sector, such as meat or dairy, would meet this
specificity requirement. However, unless use of a food miles measure were
linked to a financial incentive provided by the WTO member, it is unlikely
that such a measure would fall within the scope of subsidies as defined by
the SCM Agreement.
In relation to food miles, it is important to note that subsidies for agri-
cultural commodities are subject to the specialized rules of the Agreement
on Agriculture, as well as to aspects of the SCM Agreement.258 Agricul-
tural products are defined in Annex I to the Agreement, which lists prod-
ucts in Chapters 1-24 of the Harmonized System, except for fish and fish
products.259 The subsidies provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture re-
late to the total aggregate levels of subsidies provided by the relevant
WTO member, rather than to the form of subsidies (as regulated by the
SCM Agreement).260 The Agreement on Agriculture rules applying to
subsidies are complex and relate to individual commitment levels for each
WTO member, which makes it difficult to analyze in the abstract whether
food miles schemes would be consistent with these provisions.
As we have seen in this Part, there are numerous potential bases for a
WTO challenge relating to a food miles labeling requirement. Given these
vulnerabilities, and the lack of correlation between food miles and envi-
ronmental harm, thought must be given to alternative measures govern-
ments could pursue. We address these issues in Part IV, below, giving
consideration to fairness and equity issues as well as practicability and
efficacy.
IV. DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
TO FOOD MILES
A. Life Cycle Analysis – A Better Approach?261
Although the use of the food miles concept is still prevalent, as noted
above there has been increasing recognition that this concept is flawed. In
255. Horlick & Clarke, supra note 253, at 865–866; Ruddy, supra note 253, at 483 n.38.
256. SCM Agreement, supra note 254, art. 1.2.
257. Id. art. 2.1.
258. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410 arts. 13, 21.
259. Id., Annex 1, art. 1(i).
260. In relation to domestic subsidies, see id. art. 6.
261. “Life cycle analysis” is also sometimes referred to as “life cycle assessment” in the
literature.
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particular, there is not a strong correlation between food miles and GHG
emissions. There is widespread agreement that a more accurate way to
measure the environmental harm associated with a product is to conduct a
life cycle analysis (LCA). Such an analysis takes into account the GHG
emissions resulting from all stages of the production process—from “cra-
dle to grave” to identify a product’s overall “carbon footprint.” Transpor-
tation is a relevant component of the analysis but is measured in a more
scientific way than merely identifying the distance travelled. Instead, the
type of transportation (air, rail, ship, truck, etc.) is taken into account. This
leads to an accounting for the significant differences in the emissions
caused by different modes of transport, with air freight recognized as far
exceeding the other modes. However, LCA makes clear that even this dis-
tinction is of limited significance in the overall analysis, because transpor-
tation only comprises a small percentage—usually estimated as under ten
percent—of the total emissions of an agricultural product when LCA is
conducted.
LCA takes into account numerous factors, including emissions from:
the use of farm equipment throughout the growing and harvesting process;
the processing, packaging; storing, and transporting of agricultural prod-
ucts; the production of electricity to refrigerate products and to heat barns;
the methane produced by ruminant animals; and the nitrous oxide re-
leased as a result of using nitrogen-based fertilizers.262 Because of the
many elements comprising a life cycle analysis, the calculations are neces-
sarily somewhat inexact; however, they give a far better picture of the
overall environmental impact of food stuffs than does the simplistic mea-
sure of how many miles or kilometers the food has travelled.
Even though transportation is a relatively minor component of a
food’s carbon footprint based on a life cycle analysis, transportation has
been a consistent, disproportionate focus of many policymakers and busi-
nesses. Marks & Spencer has recently signed an agreement with New Zea-
land meat processor Alliance Group to sell its New Zealand lamb
alongside U.K. lamb.263 Alliance Group has developed a program, called
Hoofprint, to measure the carbon footprints of its farms. Apparently, the
favorable comparison of the emissions of these farms with those of U.K.
farms led Marks & Spencer to enter an arrangement with Alliance
Group.264
The Marks & Spencer announcement came on the heels of a study by
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research indicating,
among other findings, that Britons could help the environment by
262. Baddeley et al., supra note 53, at 69.
263. Terri Russell, Alliance Secures Single Deal to UK, STUFF.CO.NZ (Nov. 2, 2012 10:08
AM), http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/farming/7897332/Alliance-secures-single-deal-to-UK.
264. Maria Slade, Save the Planet: Buy Kiwi Lamb, STUFF.CO.NZ  (Nov. 2, 2012, 08:31
AM), http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/business/7897488/Save-the-planet-Buy-Kiwi-
lamb.
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purchasing New Zealand lamb instead of domestic lamb because the im-
ported product is produced much more efficiently.265
While most carbon labeling schemes are operated by private organiza-
tions and therefore likely fall outside the WTO’s oversight,266 there are
examples of government-run programs. Recently France initiated the
Grenelle 2 Law, which, among other things, included a one-year trial pro-
gram relating to product carbon footprint labeling.267 In the WTO’s TBT
Committee, Korea has expressed concern that France’s carbon footprint
labeling requirement appeared to be mandatory, noting that carbon label-
ing schemes are generally voluntary.268 Korea also disagreed with France’s
inclusion of emissions from transportation in the carbon footprint calcula-
tion, fearing this would lead French consumers to favor even environmen-
tally unfriendly locally made products over more environmentally-friendly
imported products solely because of the difference in distance travelled.
Additional concerns were raised concerning proper disclosures under the
TBT Agreement and over the possibility such a law could become perma-
nent and mandatory, which would disadvantage imports in the French
market.269
The European Union clarified that while an early draft of France’s law
had provided for the carbon footprint labeling provisions to be mandatory,
under the final version, they would remain voluntary, at least for the dura-
tion of the pilot program. However, it is possible France will decide to
make its program mandatory following its assessment of the trial
period.270
In 2007, the U.K.’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Af-
fairs (DEFRA) announced a collaboration with the Carbon Trust, a Gov-
ernment advisory body, to study how to conduct LCA with the ultimate
goal of having retailers place carbon labels on all products.271 DEFRA
ultimately determined that the science currently available did not support
265. Sonja J. Vermeulen, Bruce M. Campbell & John S.I. Ingram, Climate Change and
Food Systems, 37 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 195 (2012); Buy New Zealand Lamb to
Save the Planet, Say UN Scientists-Because British Farming Methods Produce Twice as Much
Greenhouse Gas, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 31, 2012, 10:12 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2225772/Go-vegetarian-save-planet-Double-greenhouse-gases-comes-farming-ani
mals-estimated.html.
266. See Appleton – Private Standards, supra note 126, at 143–147. For a discussion of
private standards and the SPS Agreement, see Tracey Epps, Demanding Perfection: Private
Food Standards and the SPS Agreement, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND NATIONAL
AUTONOMY (Meredith Kolsky Lewis & Susy Frankel eds., 2010).
267. Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat, Minutes of the
Meeting of 15–16 June, 2011, 13, G/TBT/M/54 (Sept. 20, 2011).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 13.
270. Id. at 14. See also Baddeley et al., supra note 53, at 67 (discussing France’s
program).
271. Harry Wallop, Plan for Carbon Footprint on Every Label, THE TELEGRAPH (May
31, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1553092/Plan-for-carbon-foot
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a plan to develop such a label, particularly given the cost of so doing and
the uncertainty as to the level of impact it would have on consumer
behavior.272
The Japanese have also been trialing a carbon footprint program; its
Carbon Footprint System has been operating since 2009.273
B. Limitations of LCA
On the one hand, it is a positive development that there seems to be a
growing recognition, both in government and in the retail sector, that life
cycle analyses provide a more accurate indication of GHG emissions than
solely looking at the distance a product has travelled. On the other hand,
however, LCA is not a panacea. Conducting LCA is time consuming, ex-
pensive, and not susceptible to particularly accurate calculation. One as-
pect of the inherent inaccuracy is that a carbon footprint label cannot
reflect how the product is used after purchase. For example getting pota-
toes from farm to the shop may have relatively low associated emissions,
but if they are then cooked by boiling with the lid off and then mashing,
their emissions increase dramatically. Post-sale activities, including trans-
porting the product from store to home, cooking methods, and how the
waste is disposed can have a significant impact on a product’s true carbon
footprint, but these variables will not be accounted for in a carbon foot-
print label directed at the customer at the point of sale. LCA therefore
does not present an entirely satisfying solution—particularly as they are
very expensive to conduct. In 2007, U.K. retail giant Tesco announced a
plan to calculate the carbon footprint for all 70,000 of its products and to
label them accordingly;274 but scrapped the effort in 2012 due to the
amount of work involved—estimated at several months per single item.275
Given the challenges even for major businesses to undertake life cycle
analyses, it seems inevitable that developing countries would be disadvan-
taged by widespread use of carbon footprint labeling in their export mar-
kets. The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment has identified
several such negative impacts for developing countries.276
In addition, measures requiring life cycle analysis may lead to chal-
lenges of WTO inconsistency, much like food miles measures. While LCA
272. Defra Findings on the Effectiveness of Food Labelling to Promote Behaviour
Change, FOOD CLIMATE RESEARCH NETWORK, http://www.fcrn.org.uk/research-library/car
bon-labelling/food/defra-findings-effectiveness-food-labelling-promote-behaviour-change
(last visited May 15, 2014).
273. Baddeley et al., supra note 53, at 67.
274. Julia Finch & John Vidal, You’ve Checked the Price and Calorie Count, Now Here’s
the Carbon Cost, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2007, 4:35 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/busi
ness/2007/jan/19/ethicalbusiness.supermarkets.
275. Adam Vaughan, Tesco Drops Carbon-label Pledge, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2012,
10:02 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jan/30/tesco-drops-carbon-label
ling.
276. See Committee on Trade & Environment, Report (1996) of the Committee on
Trade & Environment, WT/CTE/1 (Nov. 12, 1996); Joshi, supra note 126, at 72.
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is a far more accurate measure of the environmental impact of a product
than measures based on food miles, it is—as noted above—still not able to
capture all variables contributing to a product’s carbon footprint. Given
how expensive and time-consuming it is to conduct LCA, it would be a
significantly more trade restrictive measure than requiring a food miles
label, and a panel would therefore likely require evidence of a higher level
of contribution of the measure towards its goal.
If a member imposed a measure requiring LCA-based labels, a panel
would be likely to find a relevant international standard under Article 2.4
of the TBT Agreement, namely ISO standard 14024, also called Type I
Environmental Labelling. The 14024 standard requires third-party certifi-
cation to ensure compliance with scientifically accepted criteria for mea-
suring environmental friendliness, including the use of life cycle
analyses.277 Thus the costs of complying would likely include providing for
independent certification of the LCA methodologies used.
In addition to the concerns we have identified with respect to the ac-
curacy and WTO consistency of measures based on food miles and life
cycle analyses, such initiatives also call into question issues of fairness for
those who would be affected, particularly those from developing countries.
C. Development Implications and Fundamental Fairness
There would be significant consequences for Africa if France, Ger-
many, and the United Kingdom (the countries where food miles has
gained the most traction) significantly alter their consumption patterns in
favour of local foods. A study of the effects of such a shift revealed that
the largest percentage welfare losses would be suffered by Sub-Saharan
African countries.278 Given that most African countries’ contribution to
global GHG emissions is a tiny fraction of that of developed countries,279
the food miles narrative becomes even more problematic.
In setting policies and regulations related to food and carbon emis-
sions, we should be mindful of the significant differences amongst coun-
tries in terms of their carbon emissions to date. The industrialized world
accomplished its growth and development largely in a time when humans’
effects on the environment were unrecognized. Today however, it is widely
accepted that humans are contributing to climate change through our
farming, industrial, and other practices. And it is clear that the countries
with a lengthy manufacturing and industrialized farming history will have
contributed more carbon emissions than countries that remain primarily
277. Examples of labels falling under ISO 14024 include the German Blue Angel and
the EU flower symbol. Bonsi, Hammett, & Smith, supra note 194, at 410–11.
278. New Zealand would be equally negatively affected. See Ballingall & Winchester,
supra note 6, at 1201.
279. See, e.g., African Emissions: African Major Sources of GHG, Emissions Per Capita,
and Comparison with Emissions from Other Countries, GRID ARENDAL, http://www
.grida.no/publications/vg/africa/page/3113.aspx (last visited May 15, 2014) (showing U.S. per
capita GHG emissions of 20 metric tons, with many African countries, including Kenya, with
per capita emissions of well under one-half metric ton per capita).
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subsistence farming economies. As such, when considering whether to
preference green beans from the United Kingdom over green beans from
Kenya, we should not just look at the carbon emissions implications for
each set of beans. Instead, given the relative contributions of Kenya and
the United Kingdom to increased carbon levels in the atmosphere, we
should be more favorably inclined towards the Kenyan beans than the
U.K. beans.
Edith Brown Weiss posited, nearly thirty years ago, that notions of
fairness require our generation to take actions with respect to the environ-
ment in the role of stewards or fiduciaries for future generations.280 In-
tergenerational equity should be taken into account in the context of
considering which countries’ agricultural carbon emissions should be pre-
ferred. Part of the inequity of favoring U.K. beans over Kenyan beans
derives from the actions and inactions of the United Kingdom and other
industrialized countries in generations past. In this regard, the interna-
tional trade approach could be harmonized with the international environ-
mental approach by taking into account the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility (CBDR). The CBDR concept appears in the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
and reflects the view that those who have contributed the most to carbon
emissions over time should be the ones to shoulder most of the responsi-
bility for addressing climate change.281 Industrialized countries have, until
recently, been the major carbon emitters.282 These same countries thus
should bear more responsibility in addressing the problems relating to cli-
mate change, and are in fact have a greater capacity (in terms of finances
and expertise) to do so.283
280. Edith Brown Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Eq-
uity, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495 (1984). See also Edith Brown Weiss, Climate Change, Intergenera-
tional Equity and International Law: An Introductory Note, 15 CLIMACTIC CHANGE 327
(1989).
281. 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) art.
3, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S 107, 31 I.L.M. 849 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994). Article 3
of the UNFCCC provides, in relevant part, that: “parties should protect the climate system
for the benefit of future and present generations of human kind on the basis of equity and in
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities.
Accordingly, developed countries should take the lead in combating climate change and the
adverse effects thereof”. Id. Note this language is not a requirement but rather a hortatory
objective.
282. Kelly McManus, The Principle of ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibility’ and
the UNFCCC, CLIMATICO (Nov. 2009), http://www.climaticoanalysis.org/wp-content/uploads/
2009/12/kmcmanus_common-responsibilities.pdf.
283. Id. Article 3 of the UNFCCC additionally includes the concept of respective capa-
bilities. This concept is sometimes bundled with common but differentiated responsibilities
and discussed as a single principle. See, e.g., Joanne Scott & Lavanya Rajamani, EU Climate
Change Unilateralism, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 469, 477 (2012). Our point here is primarily focused
on common but differentiated responsibilities, and we therefore do not bundle the two
together.
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D. Alternative Approaches
If food miles are inaccurate and misleading, and life cycle analyses
expensive and impractical, what should policymakers and individuals be
doing if they wish to use food as a reference point for lowering greenhouse
gas emissions? For purposes of this discussion, our comments are directed
at developed countries as it is primarily developed countries that have
been promoting the food miles narrative. While we readily acknowledge
our limited knowledge with respect to the science of addressing climate
change, available data suggests to us policy choices preferable to measures
based on food miles or LCA.
As a preliminary matter, given the significant levels of GHG emissions
emanating from developed countries relative to most developing country
agricultural exporters, it would be preferable as an equitable matter for
measures to focus on changes in domestic behaviors that result in signifi-
cant GHG emissions.
For example, one of the major contributions to GHG emissions
resulting from the food sector is the methane released by rumi-
nant animals. Accordingly, it has been estimated that reducing
meat consumption would have a significant impact on GHG emis-
sions.284 Lowering consumption of dairy products would also
make a meaningful difference, for the same reason.285
In addition, one of the reasons consuming local products can result in
higher GHG emissions, when compared with importing the like products,
relates to the energy used in storage. When U.K. customers purchase ap-
ples in the spring that were grown in the U.K. the previous fall, those
apples have been in cold storage for several months, requiring a significant
use of energy. In contrast, buying apples from the Southern Hemisphere in
the U.K. spring would mean fresher apples and far less, if any, cold stor-
age. Thus policymakers should take into account the fact that consuming
local foods that are not fresh may be a poor environmental choice when
compared to importing those same foods from countries where they are in
season. Similarly, any environmental benefit of producing a food locally
may be lost if that food can only be produced in-country if it is grown in a
temperature-controlled greenhouse.
Another factor that contributes significantly to the carbon impact of
an agricultural product is how it is transported from seller to home. The
per unit GHG emissions for a product bought from the farm but driven
home in a passenger car will likely be higher than those for a product
delivered by a home grocery service (such as Peapod) bringing the food
284. Meat Eater’s Guide to Climate Change and Health, at a Glance, ENVIRONMENTAL
WORKING GROUP, http://static.ewg.org/reports/2011/meateaters/pdf/ewg_meat_eaters_guide_
to_health_and_climate_2011.pdf (last visited May 15, 2014).
285. Christopher L. Weber & H. Scott Matthews, Food-Miles and the Relative Climate
Impacts of Food Choices in the United States, 42 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 3508, 3508 (2008)
(discussing the environmental aspects of various foods).
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from a central location. Accordingly, the positive environmental impact of
farmers’ markets could be significantly enhanced by facilitating the loca-
tion of such markets in high-density population areas and areas convenient
to public transportation.
It is also important to recognize that a comprehensive “eat local” ap-
proach could never succeed globally because of the many regions of the
world that cannot produce a varied enough diet based on their factor en-
dowments.286 And such an approach would also be expensive. We know
from the principle of comparative advantage that countries will be better
off if they produce what they are efficient at producing. Policies that would
see each country—or even each region within each country—farming all
of their own requirements for dairy, animal protein, grains, fruits, vegeta-
bles, and other food needs would be incredibly inefficient. It would also
lead to diminished welfare as food choices would be far more limited if
communities limited themselves to consuming what was locally produced.
Most climates are not conducive to producing a comprehensive food bas-
ket, and any locale with true seasons will only be able to grow fruits and
vegetables for a portion of the year. Thus, international trade principles, as
well as the reality of countries’ factor endowments, demonstrate that even
if a “locavore” approach were more environmentally friendly, it would not
be sustainable on a grand scale.
CONCLUSION
Governments, businesses, NGOs, and individuals have utilized the
food miles concept to convince consumers that buying locally sourced
foods is better for the environment than purchasing food that has been
transported from further afield. While consumers may have good reasons
to buy local foods, including a desire to support farmers in the community
or region; a preference for fresher food; and a commitment to local farm-
ing practices such as organic farming, consumers should not be fooled into
believing that one of the benefits of “locavore” behavior is reducing GHG
emissions. Food miles schemes in use at present have predominantly been
promulgated by nongovernmental entities, but there have also been mea-
sures under consideration by governments. A food miles measure with suf-
ficient government involvement will be vulnerable to challenge under
multiple WTO rules.
Although there has been a growing recognition that food miles are not
an accurate measure of environmental harm, the food miles rhetoric con-
tinues. At the same time, governments and suppliers are paying more at-
tention to the possibility of conducting life cycle analyses, which would
take into account a much wider array of metrics than just transportation in
calculating a product’s carbon footprint. However, life cycle analyses are
not a panacea. Although a better measure than food miles, life cycle analy-
ses are expensive and time consuming to undertake, and generally cannot
286. James E. McWilliams, Op-Ed, Food That Travels Well, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/06/opinion/06mcwilliams.html.
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account for significant contributors to GHG emissions such as the mode of
transport used to get the product from market to home, and the cooking
and disposal methods used by the consumer.
Mandating expensive life cycle analyses also may preclude poorer pro-
ducers from staying in the export market. In addition, to the extent gov-
ernments and individuals seek to be socially responsible, they should
factor into their decisions the fact that many poor agricultural exporting
countries do not contribute in any significant way to global greenhouse gas
emissions. We therefore need to ask ourselves, even if domestic farming
resulted in somewhat lower GHG emissions than importing fresh produce
from, e.g., Africa, is it sufficient to measure only which supply chain results
in the lowest level of emissions? Or should we also take into account the
overall GHG contribution of the countries involved? If Kenya produces
only a tiny fraction of the world’s emissions, does it make sense to prefer
that tiny fraction drops to an even more de minimis level, or is it better to
impose a degree of restraint on producers in countries that have high
levels of emissions?287
For governments and other actors in developed countries wishing to
reduce the carbon footprint associated with food, a more effective and
more development-friendly approach would be to target domestic
processes and habits that are resulting in elevated emissions, rather than
focusing on labeling initiatives that will have little, if any, positive impact
on the climate while causing harm to vulnerable participants in the inter-
national marketplace.
287. Cf. Scott & Rajamani, supra note 283, at 486 (arguing that the EU’s decision to
include aviation emissions in its emissions trading scheme did not include sufficient consider-
ation of, inter alia, the development impact of so doing, particularly the impact on African
horticultural interests).
